HealthClawGuardrails

<div align="center"> <img src=".github/assets/healthclaw-logo.png" alt="HealthClaw — AI-Powered Healthcare Intelligence" width="440"> # HealthClaw Guardrails ### The open-source security layer between AI agents and clinical data. *FHIR standardized how health data is structured. MCP standardized how AI connects to tools.* ***Nobody standardized the guardrails in between. This project does.*** <br/> <!-- Project --> [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/releases) [](LICENSE) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails) <!-- Community metrics --> [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/stargazers) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/network/members) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/issues) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/graphs/contributors) [](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/commits/main) <!-- Stack & scope --> [](#testing) [](#mcp-tools-24) [](#fhir-version-support) [](pyproject.toml) [](#docker) <br/> **[Quick Start](#quick-start)** · **[MCP Tools](#mcp-tools-24)** · **[Recipes](docs/recipes/)** · **[Claude Plugin](#install-as-a-claude-plugin)** · **[Architecture](#what-it-does)** · **[healthclaw.io](https://healthclaw.io)** · **[Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md)** </div> --- > **What it is:** an open reference implementation of the FHIR × MCP guardrail layer — PHI redaction, > immutable audit, step-up auth, and tenant isolation — that sits between *any* AI agent and *any* FHIR > server. Built in the open as a community project, MIT-licensed. Not a product, not a pitch: if the > pattern is useful, take it; if it's wrong, tell us or fix it. **This is a community effort.** It's most useful when implementers, clinicians, and standards folks poke holes in it. Issues, PRs, and "you got the SDC extraction wrong" critiques are all welcome — start with **[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)** and the **[Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)**. **At a glance:** v1.6.0 · 840+ Python + 76 Node tests · 24 MCP tools · FHIR R4 US Core v9 + R6 v6.0.0-ballot3 · HL7 SDC forms (`$populate`/`$extract`) · NQF 0018 quality measure · lab interpreter (`$interpret`) · Fasten TEFCA · HealthEx · HBO · Flexpa · Epic · MEDENT · Open Wearables · real-world actions (calls/SMS) · SMART Health Links · Claude Code plugin · OpenAI/Gemini adapters ## Release highlights Full notes live in **[Releases](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails/releases)**. | Version | Highlights | | --- | --- | | **v1.6.0** | Lab reference-range interpreter (`Observation/$interpret`) · NQF 0018 quality measure (`Measure/$evaluate-measure`) · [any-agent-framework adapters](docs/recipes/any-agent-framework.md) (OpenAI/Gemini) · [Medplum-in-front recipe](docs/recipes/healthclaw-in-front-of-medplum.md) · SMBP triage on 2025 AHA/ACC · ruff lint gate · all dependency advisories remediated | | v1.5.0 | Read-auth hardening (tenant reads authenticated, not just scoped) · HL7 SDC forms — `$populate` / `$extract` | | v1.4.0 | Six health-data connectors (Fasten TEFCA, HealthEx, Health Bank One, Flexpa, Epic, MEDENT) behind one guardrail stack | | v1.3.0 | Wearables → FHIR Observations (8 providers, LOINC/UCUM mapping, device Provenance) | | v1.2.0 | Compiled Truth — current state + append-only Provenance trail per resource | ## What It Does This is a **vendor-neutral guardrail proxy** that sits between any AI agent and any FHIR server. Every request passes through: - **PHI redaction** — Names truncated to initials, identifiers masked, addresses stripped, birth dates truncated to year - **Immutable audit trail** — Every read/write logged with tenant, agent, timestamp - **Step-up authorization** — HMAC-SHA256 tokens required for writes - **Human-in-the-loop** — Clinical writes blocked until a human confirms (HTTP 428) - **Tenant isolation** — Every query scoped to tenant, cross-tenant access blocked - **Medical disclaimers** — Injected on all clinical resource reads - **Compiled Truth** — Current state + append-only evidence trail for every resource ```text AI Agent ──▶ MCP Server ──▶ Guardrail Proxy ──▶ Any FHIR Server ↓ (HAPI, Epic, PHI redaction Medplum, etc.) Audit trail Step-up auth Human-in-the-loop ``` ## Install as a Claude Plugin HealthClaw ships as a Claude Code plugin marketplace. Two plugins are available: ```bash # Add the marketplace claude plugin marketplace add aks129/HealthClawGuardrails # Install the FHIR guardrail plugin (this repo) claude plugin install healthclaw-guardrails@healthclaw-marketplace # Install the personal-health companion plugin (SmartHealthConnect) claude plugin install smarthealthconnect@healthclaw-marketplace ``` | Plugin | Skills | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | `healthclaw-guardrails` | curatr, fasten-connect, fhir-r6-guardrails, fhir-upstream-proxy, healthex-export, phi-redaction | [aks129/HealthClawGuardrails](https://github.com/aks129/HealthClawGuardrails) | | `smarthealthconnect` | care-completion, diet-exercise, healthy-habits, kids-health, medication-refills, research-monitor | [aks129/SmartHealthConnect](https://github.com/aks129/SmartHealthConnect) | Each skill is auto-discoverable — Claude loads it when your prompt matches the skill's trigger phrases (e.g. "check my care gaps", "redact this bundle", "run Curatr on my conditions"). **Not on Claude/MCP?** The same 24 guardrailed tools run on OpenAI, Gemini, LangChain, or plain HTTP via the framework-neutral bridge in [`adapters/`](adapters/) — see [Recipe: run HealthClaw tools on any agent framework](docs/recipes/any-agent-framework.md). Guardrails stay server-side, so no framework can bypass them. ## Quick Start ```bash # Install dependencies uv sync # Run (local mode with SQLite) STEP_UP_SECRET=your-secret python main.py # Run with upstream FHIR server FHIR_UPSTREAM_URL=https://hapi.fhir.org/baseR4 STEP_UP_SECRET=your-secret python main.py # Open browser open http://localhost:5000 # Landing page with live demo open http://localhost:5000/r6-dashboard # Interactive dashboard ``` ### Docker ```bash docker-compose up -d --build # Services: # - fhir-mcp-guardrails (Flask, port 5000) # - agent-orchestrator (MCP server, port 3001) # - redis (port 6379) ``` ## MCP Tools (24) Tool names use underscores (not dots) for Claude Desktop / MCP client compatibility. **Read tools** (no step-up for public tenants): | Tool | Description | | --- | --- | | `context_get` | Retrieve pre-built context envelopes | | `fhir_read` | Read a FHIR resource (redacted) | | `fhir_search` | Search with patient, code, status, date filters | | `fhir_validate` | Structural validation | | `fhir_stats` | Observation statistics (count/min/max/mean) | | `fhir_lastn` | Most recent N observations per code | | `fhir_interpret_labs` | Lab reference-range interpretation (`$interpret`) — decision support, not diagnosis | | `fhir_permission_evaluate` | R6 Permission access control evaluation | | `fhir_subscription_topics` | List available SubscriptionTopics | | `questionnaire_populate` | SDC `$populate` — pre-fill a Questionnaire for a subject | | `curatr_evaluate` | Evaluate a FHIR resource for data quality issues | | `action_status` | Poll a real-world action (call/SMS) | **Write tools** (require step-up token): | Tool | Description | | --- | --- | | `fhir_propose_write` | Validate + preview without committing | | `fhir_commit_write` | Commit with step-up auth + human-in-the-loop | | `questionnaire_extract` | SDC `$extract` — extract resources from a completed QuestionnaireResponse | | `curatr_apply_fix` | Apply patient-approved fixes with Provenance tracking | | `action_propose` / `action_commit` | Propose / commit a real-world phone call or SMS | | `shl_generate` | Generate an encrypted SMART Health Link (QR) | **Utility tools:** | Tool | Description | | --- | --- | | `fhir_get_token` | Issue a 5-minute step-up token (call before any write) | | `fhir_seed` | Seed a tenant with demo Patient + Observations + Condition | | `fhir_compiled_truth` | Current state + Provenance evidence timeline | All tools add `_mcp_summary` with reasoning, clinical context, and limitations. ## Guardrail Demo The 6-step demo at `/r6/fhir/demo/agent-loop` shows the full guardrail sequence: 1. **PHI Redaction** — Agent reads a patient, receives redacted data 2. **$validate Gate** — Agent proposes an Observation, validated before write 3. **Permission Deny** — No Permission rule exists, access denied with reasoning 4. **Permission Permit** — Permit rule created, re-evaluation succeeds 5. **Step-up + Human-in-the-loop** — Write requires both token and human confirmation 6. **Commit + Audit** — Write succeeds, full audit trail generated ## Comparison | Feature | This Project | AWS HealthLake MCP | Medplum MCP | Raw FHIR API | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Works with any FHIR server | Yes | HealthLake only | Medplum only | N/A | | PHI redaction on reads | Yes | No | No | No | | Immutable audit trail | Yes | CloudTrail (separate) | Partial | No | | Step-up auth for writes | Yes | IAM (separate) | Medplum auth | No | | Human-in-the-loop | Yes | No | No | No | | Permission $evaluate (R6) | Yes | No | No | No | | Setup time | 10 seconds | 30+ minutes | 15+ minutes | Varies | ## FHIR Version Support | Version | Profile | Status | Resources | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | R4 | US Core v9 | **Stable** | Patient, Condition, AllergyIntolerance, Immunization, MedicationRequest, Procedure, DiagnosticReport, CarePlan, CareTeam, Goal, DocumentReference, Coverage, ServiceRequest, Location, Organization, Practitioner, PractitionerRole, RelatedPerson, Specimen, FamilyMemberHistory | | R6 | v6.0.0-ballot3 | Experimental | Permission, SubscriptionTopic, DeviceAlert, NutritionIntake, DeviceAssociation, NutritionProduct, Requirements, ActorDefinition | Both R4 and R6 resources flow through the same guardrail stack (PHI redaction, audit, step-up auth, tenant isolation). R6 ballot resources may change before final release. ## Testing ```bash # Python tests (840+ across 40+ files; includes SDC, quality, and labs suites) uv run python -m pytest tests/ -v uv run python -m pytest tests/test_r6_routes.py::test_name -v # single test # MCP server tests cd services/agent-orchestrator && npm ci && npm test # Playwright end-to-end tests (UI + API, requires Flask on :5000) cd e2e && npm ci && npx playwright install --with-deps chromium && npm test cd e2e && npm run test:headed # headed browser cd e2e && npm run test:ui # interactive UI mode ``` ## API Endpoints | Endpoint | Method | Description | | --- | --- | --- | | `/r6/fhir/metadata` | GET | CapabilityStatement | | `/r6/fhir/health` | GET | Liveness probe (reports upstream status) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}` | POST | Create resource (requires step-up) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}` | GET | Search resources | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/{id}` | GET | Read resource (redacted) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/{id}` | PUT | Update resource (requires step-up + ETag) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/$validate` | POST | Validate resource | | `/r6/fhir/Questionnaire[/{id}]/$populate` | POST | SDC — pre-fill a QuestionnaireResponse from a subject | | `/r6/fhir/QuestionnaireResponse/$extract` | POST | SDC — extract a transaction Bundle (`?dryRun=true` to preview) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/{id}/$deidentify` | GET | HIPAA Safe Harbor de-identification | | `/r6/fhir/Observation/$stats` | GET | Observation statistics | | `/r6/fhir/Observation/$lastn` | GET | Most recent observations | | `/r6/fhir/Permission/$evaluate` | POST | R6 access control evaluation | | `/r6/fhir/SubscriptionTopic/$list` | GET | Subscription topic discovery | | `/r6/fhir/Bundle/$ingest-context` | POST | Bundle ingestion + context envelope | | `/r6/fhir/context/{id}` | GET | Retrieve context envelope | | `/r6/fhir/AuditEvent` | GET | Search audit events | | `/r6/fhir/AuditEvent/$export` | GET | Export audit trail (NDJSON/Bundle) | | `/r6/fhir/demo/agent-loop` | POST | 6-step guardrail demo | | `/r6/fhir/oauth/*` | * | OAuth 2.1 + PKCE + SMART discovery | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/{id}/$curatr-evaluate` | GET | Evaluate resource data quality (Curatr) | | `/r6/fhir/{type}/{id}/$curatr-apply-fix` | POST | Apply patient-approved fixes with Provenance | ## Upstream Proxy Connect to real FHIR servers while keeping all guardrails active: ```bash FHIR_UPSTREAM_URL=https://hapi.fhir.org/baseR4 python main.py ``` - **Reads**: Fetched from upstream, then redacted + audited + disclaimers added - **Searches**: Forwarded with all query params, results redacted per entry - **Writes**: Validated locally first, then forwarded with step-up auth check - **URL rewriting**: Upstream URLs never leak to clients Tested with: HAPI FHIR R4/R5, SMART Health IT, Epic Sandbox. **Put the guardrails in front of your FHIR server** — recipe for running the redaction + audit + step-up + human-in-the-loop stack in front of **Medplum** (the same pattern works for Aidbox, Google Cloud Healthcare, or any FHIR R4 server): [docs/recipes/healthclaw-in-front-of-medplum.md](docs/recipes/healthclaw-in-front-of-medplum.md). A repeatable integration test (`tests/test_medplum_in_front.py`) proves a Medplum-returned Patient comes back redacted + audited and writes are step-up gated before reaching Medplum. ## Curatr — Patient-Owned Data Quality Curatr is a patient-facing data quality skill that evaluates FHIR health records for coding issues and lets the patient decide how to resolve them. ```text 1. Patient connects data → HealthClaw Guardrails deidentifies and loads it 2. OpenClaw calls curatr.evaluate → checks codes against live terminology APIs 3. Issues presented in plain language with impact and fix suggestions 4. Patient approves fixes → curatr.apply_fix updates resource + creates Provenance 5. Optional: generate a structured correction request for the source provider ``` **What Curatr checks on a Condition:** | Check | Service | Example | | --- | --- | --- | | Deprecated code system | Local lookup (no network) | ICD-9-CM → critical | | ICD-10-CM code validity | NLM Clinical Tables API | Invalid code → warning | | SNOMED CT / LOINC validity | tx.fhir.org (HL7 public) | Unknown code → warning | | RxNorm drug code | RXNAV API (NLM) | Missing RXCUI → warning | | Display name accuracy | Cross-checked with canonical term | Mismatch → suggestion | | Missing required fields | Structural | No clinicalStatus → warning | Every fix creates a linked **Provenance** resource recording patient intent, field changes, and agent attribution. All changes are audited in the immutable trail. **OpenClaw skill:** `skills/curatr/SKILL.md` ## SMART Health Links (Kill the Clipboard) Patient-controlled encrypted record sharing via QR code, implemented on top of **[jmandel/kill-the-clipboard-skill](https://github.com/jmandel/kill-the-clipboard-skill)** (MIT, pinned `fa0020d`) — credit Josh Mandel. HealthClaw governs what enters the bundle (step-up auth, profiles, guardrails, audit trail); KTC governs sharing (zero-knowledge server-side storage, SHL STU 1 protocol, revocation, in-browser viewer). **What it does:** The `shl_generate` MCP tool (Write group, step-up required) fetches the patient's guardrailed FHIR bundle, encrypts it client-side in the MCP server (the SHL server never sees plaintext), uploads ciphertext, and returns: - `shlink` — the `shlink:/` URI to encode in a QR (an encrypted pointer, not data) - `viewer_link` — browser URL for clinic staff - `manage_link` — patient-only revocation + access-log URL **Security:** The QR encodes only the encrypted pointer. PHI never appears in the QR image. The SHL server stores only ciphertext + `sha256(auth_token)`. Persona hard rule: see `skills/share-health-qr/SKILL.md` — never direct-encode PHI into QR images (incident 2026-06-12). ### Quick Start (local) ```bash # Start the SHL storage server (profile `shl`) docker-compose --profile shl up -d # Tell the MCP server where the SHL server lives # Add to services/agent-orchestrator/.env or export: export SHL_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8000 ``` Without `SHL_SERVER_URL`, `shl_generate` returns an explicit simulation stub (`simulated: true`) — never a fake link. ### Railway Deploy ```bash # 1. Add the SHL service railway add --service shl-server # 2. Attach a persistent volume (SQLite lives here) railway service shl-server && railway volume add --mount-path /data # 3. Configure the SHL server railway variables --service shl-server \ --set BASE_URL=<public-url-of-shl-server> \ --set DB_PATH=/data/db.sqlite # 4. Expose a public domain railway domain --service shl-server # 5. Deploy — MUST run from the shl-server directory cd services/shl-server && railway up --service shl-server # 6. Wire the MCP server to the SHL server railway variables --service mcp-server \ --set SHL_SERVER_URL=<public-url-of-shl-server> ``` > **Caveat 1 — deploy from the right directory:** The repo-root `railway.toml` > targets the Flask Dockerfile. If you run `railway up --service shl-server` > from the repo root, Railway uses the wrong Dockerfile and the deploy fails. > Always `cd services/shl-server` first — that directory has its own > `railway.toml` that points to the correct image. > > **Caveat 2 — watchPatterns skip:** A service that inherited `watchPatterns` > from the root config may silently skip Dockerfile-only deploys (no source > file changes detected). The per-service `railway.toml` in `services/shl-server/` > overrides this after the first successful build. If deploys are skipped, force > one with `railway up --service shl-server` from the shl-server directory. > > **Caveat 3 — simulation mode:** Without `SHL_SERVER_URL` on the MCP server, > `shl_generate` returns `{ simulated: true, note: "SHL_SERVER_URL not > configured — returned stub." }`. Personas surface this note verbatim and > never improvise an alternative. **OpenClaw skill:** `skills/share-health-qr/SKILL.md` ## R6-Specific Resources (Experimental) These resources are part of the FHIR R6 ballot3 specification and may change before final release. | Resource | What's New in R6 | | --- | --- | | Permission | Access control (separate from Consent), `$evaluate` operation | | SubscriptionTopic | Restructured pub/sub (introduced R5, maturing R6) | | DeviceAlert | ISO/IEEE 11073 device alarms | | NutritionIntake | Dietary consumption tracking | | DeviceAssociation | Device-patient relationships | | NutritionProduct | Nutritional product definitions | | Requirements | Functional requirements tracking | | ActorDefinition | Actor role definitions | ## US Core v9 R4 Resources (Stable) Standard FHIR R4 resources conforming to US Core Implementation Guide v9. These are widely deployed in US healthcare and stable for production use. AllergyIntolerance, Immunization, MedicationRequest, Medication, MedicationDispense, Procedure, DiagnosticReport, CarePlan, CareTeam, Goal, DocumentReference, Location, Organization, Practitioner, PractitionerRole, RelatedPerson, Coverage, ServiceRequest, Specimen, FamilyMemberHistory ## Environment Variables | Variable | Required | Default | Description | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `STEP_UP_SECRET` | Production | — | HMAC-SHA256 signing secret | | `FHIR_UPSTREAM_URL` | No | — | Upstream FHIR server (enables proxy mode) | | `SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI` | Production | `sqlite:///mcp_server.db` | Database connection | | `SESSION_SECRET` | No | (dev key) | Flask session secret | | `FHIR_UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT` | No | 15 | Upstream request timeout (seconds) | | `FHIR_LOCAL_BASE_URL` | No | — | Local URL for response URL rewriting | ## Project Structure ```text main.py Flask app entry point app.py Web UI routes (landing, dashboard) r6/ routes.py R6 FHIR REST Blueprint (1,732 lines) models.py R6Resource, ContextEnvelope, AuditEventRecord validator.py FHIR R6 structural validation redaction.py PHI redaction (names, identifiers, addresses, DOB, telecom) audit.py Immutable AuditEvent recording stepup.py HMAC-SHA256 step-up token management oauth.py OAuth 2.1 + PKCE + SMART-on-FHIR discovery health_compliance.py Disclaimers, HITL, HIPAA Safe Harbor, audit export context_builder.py Bundle ingestion + context envelopes rate_limit.py Per-tenant rate limiting fhir_proxy.py Upstream FHIR server proxy with URL rewriting curatr.py Curatr data quality engine (terminology lookups + fix application) services/agent-orchestrator/ src/index.ts MCP server (Streamable HTTP + SSE) src/tools.ts 12 tool definitions + executor (incl. curatr.evaluate, curatr.apply_fix) e2e/ Playwright end-to-end tests templates/ Jinja2 (landing page, dashboard) static/ CSS + JS for interactive dashboard skills/curatr/ Curatr OpenClaw skill definition tests/ 266 pytest tests (8 files, incl. test_us_core_r4.py) ``` ## Personal FHIR data store — patient import flow This walkthrough shows how to go from a raw HealthEx export to querying your own records through Claude Code's MCP tools. ### 1. Start the stack ```bash uv sync uv run python main.py # Flask on :5000 cd services/agent-orchestrator && npm ci && npm start # MCP on :3001 ``` ### 2. Import your HealthEx / Flexpa / generic FHIR bundle ```bash # Dry-run first to preview without writing python scripts/import_healthex.py \ --bundle-file ~/Downloads/my-records.json \ --dry-run # Real import — prints context_id on success python scripts/import_healthex.py \ --bundle-file ~/Downloads/my-records.json \ --tenant-id my-patient \ --step-up-secret "$STEP_UP_SECRET" ``` ### 3. Connect Claude Code via MCP `.mcp.json` in this repo auto-configures Claude Code when you open the project. Update `X-Tenant-ID` to match your `--tenant-id`: ```json { "mcpServers": { "healthclaw-local": { "type": "http", "url": "http://localhost:3001/mcp", "headers": { "X-Tenant-ID": "my-patient" } } } } ``` Then in Claude Code: ```text Use fhir_search to find all my Conditions Use context_get with context_id <ctx-id> to get my full context envelope Use curatr_evaluate on Condition/<id> to check data quality ``` ### 4. Set up Fasten Connect (optional) ```bash # .env additions FASTEN_PUBLIC_KEY=<key> FASTEN_PRIVATE_KEY=<key> FASTEN_WEBHOOK_SECRET=<secret> FASTEN_CURATR_SCAN=true # auto-run Curatr after each import ``` Records arrive via webhook at `/r6/fasten/webhook` and are stored under the patient's canonical tenant ID. ### 5. Deidentify for sharing ```bash # HIPAA Safe Harbor curl -H "X-Tenant-ID: my-patient" \ http://localhost:5000/r6/fhir/Patient/pt-1/\$deidentify # Patient-controlled (preserves birthDate, strips institutional identifiers) curl -H "X-Tenant-ID: my-patient" \ "http://localhost:5000/r6/fhir/Patient/pt-1/\$deidentify?mode=patient-controlled&patient_id=my-patient" ``` ### 6. Telegram bot (optional) ```bash TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=<token> TENANT_ID=my-patient \ FHIR_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5000/r6/fhir \ python openclaw/bot.py ``` Commands: `/health`, `/conditions`, `/labs`, `/curatr`, `/curatr fix`, `/approve`. Or via Docker Compose: ```bash docker-compose --profile openclaw up -d ``` ### 7. Use Medplum as the backing FHIR store (optional) Set in `.env` (leave `FHIR_UPSTREAM_URL` empty): ```bash MEDPLUM_BASE_URL=https://api.medplum.com/fhir/R4 MEDPLUM_CLIENT_ID=<id> MEDPLUM_CLIENT_SECRET=<secret> ``` All guardrails apply to Medplum responses identically to local SQLite mode. Access tokens are cached in Redis (key `medplum:access_token`; falls back to in-process cache when Redis is unavailable). --- ## Known Limitations - Local mode: JSON blob storage with table-scan search (no indexed fields) - Structural validation only (no StructureDefinition conformance or terminology binding) - SubscriptionTopic stored but notifications not dispatched - Human-in-the-loop is a header flag (`X-Human-Confirmed`), not cryptographic confirmation — a compensating control for the demo, not proof a human acted - OAuth endpoints are for discovery/SMART advertisement; route enforcement is via step-up + read-auth tokens, and the auto-approve authorize flow is limited to public/demo tenants (no per-user consent screen) - No historical versioning (version_id increments but old versions not retrievable) - Upstream proxy: no response caching, no cross-version translation - **Security is config-dependent — production requires** `READ_AUTH_ENABLED=true` (authenticate non-public reads), `INTERNAL_TOKEN_MINT_SECRET` (gate token mint/seed for non-public tenants; fail-closed in prod when unset), `PUBLIC_TENANTS` limited to synthetic demo tenants, a real `SESSION_SECRET`/`STEP_UP_SECRET`, and https-only upstreams - Step-up tokens are valid for multiple writes within their 5-min TTL (not single-use); irreversible actions rely on state-machine idempotency (guarded `WHERE status='proposed'` claim) rather than nonce consumption ## Contributing — this is a community effort HealthClaw Guardrails is developed in the open as a shared reference, not a commercial product. The guardrail layer between AI agents and clinical data only gets trustworthy if a lot of people with different vantage points pressure-test it. We especially want: - **Implementers** building FHIR × MCP integrations — tell us where the patterns break in the real world. - **Clinicians & compliance folks** — challenge the redaction profiles, audit model, and the documented HIPAA postures. - **Standards people** (HL7 / SDC / SMART) — tell us where we've diverged from the spec, especially on `$populate`/`$extract`. - **Anyone** — open an issue, file a "you got this wrong," or send a PR. Start here: **[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)** · **[Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)** · **[CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md)** · **[Security policy](SECURITY.md)** Good first contributions are labeled in the issue tracker. No CLA, no gatekeeping — just the MIT license below. ## License MIT — free to use, fork, and build on. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).