codemore

<div align="center"> <img width="125" height="125" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d0e5d020-38ce-44f7-9426-f7fb1b931130" /> # CodeMore ### The static analyzer your AI agent reads. AI agents ship code fast — and ship bugs fast. CodeMore scans the code, then hands the **agent that wrote it** a machine-readable report with the exact fix and the criteria to verify it. The agent closes its own findings. [**Website**](https://codemore.tech) · [**Docs**](https://codemore.tech/docs) · [**Rule Catalog**](docs/rules) · [**Report Schema**](docs/schema.md) · [**Changelog**](CHANGELOG.md) [](https://www.npmjs.com/package/codemore) [](LICENSE) [](docs/rules) [](docs/external-tools.md) [](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md) [](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md) ```bash npx codemore@latest scan . ``` **59 native rules · 8 external adapters · CLI · MCP server · VS Code extension · GitHub Action — one report, byte-identical on every surface.** </div> --- ## Table of contents - [Why CodeMore](#why-codemore) - [Quick start](#quick-start) — [CLI](#cli) · [MCP server](#mcp-server--cursor-claude-code-codex-claude-desktop) · [VS Code](#vs-code-extension) · [GitHub Action](#github-action) · [Hosted](#web-scanner-hosted) - [What it catches](#what-it-catches) - [The report is the product](#the-report-is-the-product) - [Agentic fix loop](#agentic-fix-loop) - [Accuracy, measured honestly](#accuracy-measured-honestly) - [What CodeMore does *not* catch](#what-codemore-does-not-catch) - [Architecture](#architecture) - [Development](#development) · [Contributing](#contributing) · [License](#license) --- ## Why CodeMore AI-assisted coding ships vulnerabilities at a measured, growing rate: | Finding | Source | |---|---| | **45%** of AI-generated code carries an OWASP Top-10 vulnerability | Veracode 2025/26 | | **98%** of 1,072 scanned vibe-coded sites had ≥ 1 security flaw | Symbiotic | | **70%** of audited Lovable apps shipped with Supabase RLS disabled | DEV | | **2×** baseline secret-leak rate on AI-tool-assisted commits | GitGuardian SOSS 2026 | | **35 CVEs/month** attributed to AI-generated code (was 6/month in January) | March 2026 | Existing scanners (SonarQube, DeepSource, Snyk) target **human reviewers sitting at dashboards**. But this code wasn't written by a human — and the LLM that wrote it is fully capable of fixing its own bug, *if the report is shaped for a machine reader*. That's the wedge. CodeMore is not another SAST dashboard. **It's the report contract between a scanner and a coding agent**: every finding carries a `suggestedFix` with a patch template and explicit `verificationCriteria` — not just "here's a problem," but "here's exactly how to know you fixed it." > **The agent that wrote the bug can also write the fix — if it can read the report.** --- ## Quick start ### CLI ```bash npx codemore@latest scan . ``` Emits [`codemore-report.json`](docs/schema.md): every finding pinned to `file:line:column` with rule citation, fix template, and verification criteria. Pipe it to your agent and watch findings close. ```bash codemore scan . --fail-on BLOCKER # CI gate: non-zero exit on any BLOCKER codemore scan . --external-tools ruff,biome # opt in to external tools codemore scan . --external-tools all # ruff · golangci-lint · clippy · biome · bandit · gitleaks · npm-audit · pip-audit codemore scan . --format sarif --out codemore.sarif # GitHub code scanning (upload-sarif) codemore fix . --rule <id> --write # agentic fix loop from the CLI (needs an LLM API key) codemore baseline create # adopt on an existing repo without drowning in legacy findings ``` ### MCP server — Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Claude Desktop ```bash npx codemore mcp # print config snippet + every client's config path npx codemore mcp install --client cursor # merge into existing config (backs up first, --dry-run supported) ``` <details> <summary>Manual config snippet</summary> ```jsonc { "mcpServers": { "codemore": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "codemore@latest", "serve-mcp"] } } } ``` </details> Six tools exposed: `scan_project` · `scan_file` · `explain_issue` · `suggest_fix` · `apply_fix` · `validate_fix`. ### VS Code extension ```bash npm run vsce:package # builds codemore-<version>.vsix code --install-extension codemore-<version>.vsix ``` Inline diagnostics; code-action quick-fix invokes the agentic loop (plan → generate → validate → retry, max 3 attempts). Marketplace listing coming — until then, install from the packaged `.vsix`. ### GitHub Action ```yaml # .github/workflows/codemore.yml on: pull_request: branches: [main] jobs: scan: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read pull-requests: write steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: abhinavteja123/codemore@v1 with: fail-on: BLOCKER ``` PR-comment bot; only fails the build on findings **new since** the committed `.codemore-baseline.json`. A full copy-paste security gate chaining CodeMore + Ruff + Biome + Bandit + Gitleaks + npm-audit + pip-audit + Checkov lives at [`templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml`](templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml) ([walkthrough](docs/security-gate.md)). ### Web Scanner (hosted) Sign in at [**codemore.tech**](https://codemore.tech), paste a public GitHub URL or upload a ZIP — same report, same fingerprint, zero install. --- ## What it catches **59 native rules** across **6 packs**, every rule mapped to a *cited real-world incident class* — not a hypothetical: | Pack | Rules | Highlights | |---|---:|---| | `core-security` | 20 | SQL injection (concat), path traversal, weak crypto, insecure deserialization, `eval`, shell injection, TLS-off, hardcoded secret patterns, hardcoded passwords (B105-class) | | `core-quality` | 22 | Unused vars/imports/exports, cyclomatic complexity, dead conditionals, leftover prints, async-without-await, unreachable code | | `vibe-frontend` | 5 | XSS (`dangerouslySetInnerHTML`), CORS-with-credentials, missing rate limit, missing cookie flags, file-upload validation | | `vibe-secrets` | 4 | Public env leaks (`NEXT_PUBLIC_*` / `VITE_*` / `REACT_APP_*`), hardcoded JWTs, MCP config secrets, CI/CD YAML secrets | | `vibe-auth` | 3 | BOLA, missing session checks, inverted auth | | `vibe-supabase` | 3 | RLS-off, RLS-permissive (`USING (true)`), anon-key bundled to client | | `vibe-llm` | 2 | LLM-output → eval/exec/SQL sink, agent-tool-no-confirm | **8 external adapters** (off by default, opt in via `--external-tools`): `ruff` · `golangci-lint` · `clippy` · `biome` · `bandit` · `gitleaks` · `npm-audit` · `pip-audit`. Findings are namespaced `ext:<tool>:<rule-id>` — no collision with native rules; a missing binary skips silently instead of crashing. **The walker catches what `.gitignore` hides.** When a developer "hides" a leaked secret file by gitignoring it, most scanners stop seeing it — but it's still on disk, in tarballs, in Docker images. CodeMore always scans secret-shaped filenames (`.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `firebase-adminsdk*.json`, `credentials.json`, `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, …) even when gitignored. This is exactly how the audits found real production OpenAI keys, Google API keys, and Firebase admin SDK creds that other tools silently missed. Opt out with `--respect-gitignore-fully`. Per-rule documentation: [`docs/rules`](docs/rules) — 58 pages, one per rule. --- ## The report is the product Every surface emits the same schema-stable [`codemore-report.json`](docs/schema.md) — verified **byte-identical** (modulo timestamps and instance IDs) on every release by [`test/parity.test.ts`](test/parity.test.ts): ``` CLI : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… MCP : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… Daemon : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… ``` **One brain, four skins.** The schema is the API; surfaces are interchangeable. <details> <summary><b>Full report example</b> — <code>codemore-report.json</code> v1.0.0</summary> ```jsonc { "schemaVersion": "1.0.0", "tool": { "name": "codemore", "version": "0.2.6" }, "project": { "root": ".", "framework": "next.js", "language": "typescript", "fingerprint": "sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…" }, "summary": { "issuesTotal": 42, "bySeverity": { "BLOCKER": 2, "CRITICAL": 5, "MAJOR": 15, "MINOR": 18, "INFO": 2 }, "byCategory": { "security": 12, "bug": 7, "…": "…" }, "filesAnalyzed": 87, "linesOfCode": 12450, "technicalDebtMinutes": 1840 }, "issues": [ { "id": "vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "ruleVersion": "1.2.0", "instanceId": "01HZ…", "severity": "BLOCKER", "confidence": 0.95, "category": "security", "title": "Supabase table has no RLS policy", "evidence": { "file": "supabase/migrations/001_init.sql", "line": 14, "column": 1, "endLine": 14, "endColumn": 60, "snippet": "create table profiles (id uuid primary key, …);", "matchedPattern": "create-table-without-rls" }, "whyItMatters": "Public Supabase client can read/write all rows. 70 % of Lovable apps leak data through this.", "citation": "https://codemore.tech/rules/vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "suggestedFix": { "type": "code-patch", "instructions": "Add `ALTER TABLE profiles ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;` plus at least one policy scoped to authenticated users.", "patchTemplate": "…", "verificationCriteria": [ "Migration contains ALTER TABLE … ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY", "At least one CREATE POLICY exists for the table", "Re-scan no longer reports vibe-supabase-rls-disabled for this file" ] }, "suppression": { "available": true, "directive": "// codemore-ignore: vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "scope": "same-line | next-line | file" } } ], "agentInstructions": { "preamble": "You are fixing issues found by CodeMore. Apply patches one issue at a time. After each, request re-scan via validate_fix.", "orderingHint": "blockers → criticals → majors", "doNotTouch": ["node_modules/**", "*.lock", ".env*"], "stopOn": "first-validator-failure" }, "meta": { "rulesEnabled": 58, "packsLoaded": ["core-security", "core-quality", "vibe-supabase", "…"], "scanDurationMs": 4321 } } ``` </details> Schema source-of-truth: [`shared/report/schema.json`](shared/report/schema.json). Breaking changes bump `schemaVersion` major and ship a migration guide. --- ## Agentic fix loop `apply_fix` runs a four-stage loop, up to 3 retries per finding — it terminates on first PASS and **never silently keeps a failing patch**: ``` detect ──► plan ──► generate ──► validate │ ├──► (fail) → re-plan, retry (≤ 3) └──► (pass) → apply patch · next finding ``` - [`agenticFixer.ts`](daemon/services/agenticFixer.ts) — orchestrator; reads finding + rule citation + framework context - [`validatorHarness.ts`](daemon/services/validatorHarness.ts) — applies the patch in a tempdir copy, re-runs the rule, re-runs file-scoped tests, returns `pass | fail` + diagnostics - LLM provider plug-ins: OpenAI · Anthropic · Gemini · local, configurable via workspace setting (VS Code) or `CODEMORE_LLM_PROVIDER` env (CLI) --- ## Accuracy, measured honestly Synthetic benchmarks lie; real codebases don't. Every release is audited against real projects, and the numbers are published — including the bad ones. **2026-07-07 audit** ([full report](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md)) — 7 codebases (Python app, 1.35M-LOC TS monorepo, polyglot Rust, synthetic ground-truth apps, self-scan): **100% of planted vulnerabilities detected**, a real OpenAI key caught in a production `.env`, **~90% BLOCKER true-positive rate**, self-scan noise reduced 85% after fixing four false-positive classes. **2026-06-12 audit** ([full report](accuracy-report-2026-06-12.md)) — 10 real codebases, aggregate **~85% BLOCKER TP rate**, above DeepSource's ≥ 75% production bar: <details> <summary>Per-project results</summary> | Project | Findings | BLOCKERs | TP rate | Notes | |---|---:|---:|---:|---| | EchoVault | 122 | 10 | **100%** | Real Supabase RLS holes | | ProofSnap | 134 | 4 | **100%** | | | AImentor | 224 | 5 | **100%** | Real OpenAI keys hidden by `.gitignore` | | Hackathonnn | 129 | 3 | **100%** | | | shopsec | 113 | 5 | **100%** | | | Senti | 155 | 8 | **100%** | | | open-design | 8,615 | 101 | ~80% | | | Gen ai | 63 | 4 | 75% | Real Firebase admin SDK creds | | codemore self | 282 | 6 | 17% | Intentional landing-demo data | | **Aggregate (excl. self)** | **9,755** | **140** | **~85%** | | </details> ### Quality gates, enforced in CI - **100% TP / 100% FP** on the 116-fixture corpus regression suite — every rule ships with at least one true-positive and one false-positive fixture under `corpus/rules/<rule-id>/{tp,fp}/` - Lifecycle gating: rules are `experimental` → `beta` → `stable`, promotion requires fixture pairs plus real-world FP-rate evidence via opt-in telemetry; rules below the precision bar are gated behind `--enable-experimental` or ship with reduced confidence so agents weight them lower | Lifecycle | Default | Promotion bar | |---|---|---| | `experimental` | off by default | one fixture pair | | `beta` | on by default | ≥ 3 fixture pairs + 14-day FP rate < 15% | | `stable` | ships in default pack | 30-day FP rate < 5% + reference apps clean | | `deprecated` | warns, removed next major | — | --- ## What CodeMore does *not* catch Out of scope **by design** — static analysis can't judge these, and an agent can't auto-fix them from a source diff. The rule is *"agent-actionable or it's not a rule"*: Weak password policies · audit-log completeness · business-logic flaws · race conditions · open S3/GCS buckets · DAST findings · MFA presence. Full list with reasoning: [`docs/limitations.md`](docs/limitations.md). For these, pair CodeMore with OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, `checkov`, or your IdP's compliance dashboard. --- ## Telemetry — opt-in only Off by default. Enable per-scan with `--telemetry`. Collected: tool version, hashed project fingerprint, surface, rule-fire events. **Never collected:** file paths, contents, snippets, evidence text — the endpoint enforces a Zod `strict()` schema and rejects any payload containing those keys with HTTP 400. 64 KB payload cap, per-fingerprint rate limiting, RLS denies all reads. --- ## Architecture ``` codemore/ ├── shared/ ← one brain, shared across all surfaces │ ├── packs/ ← 58 rule modules across 6 packs │ ├── rules/ ← registry, lifecycle gating, suppression, AST helpers (TS + Python) │ └── report/ ← codemore-report.json v1.0.0 schema + types + writer ├── daemon/ │ ├── cli/ ← CLI entry · walker · ignore resolver · baseline diff │ ├── mcp/ ← MCP server (6 tools) │ ├── external/ ← 8 opt-in adapters, fail-loud parsers │ ├── services/ ← agentic fixer · validator harness · scan orchestrator │ └── llm/ ← OpenAI · Anthropic · Gemini · local provider plug-ins ├── src/ ← VS Code extension (forks daemon, renders diagnostics) ├── web/ ← Next.js: landing · dashboard · docs · /api/telemetry ├── corpus/rules/<id>/{tp,fp}/ ← 116 TP/FP fixture pairs, 1:1 with the rule catalog ├── docs/ ← schema · limitations · security-gate · 58 per-rule pages └── templates/ ← copy-paste GitHub Action workflows ``` **One brain (`shared/`), four skins (CLI, MCP, extension, Action), one report schema** — kept honest by the parity test, not by a slogan. --- ## Development ```bash git clone https://github.com/abhinavteja123/codemore cd codemore CODEMORE_SKIP_BINARY_DOWNLOAD=1 npm ci # skip binary downloads in dev npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json # type-check the publishable surface npm run test:unit # unit tests (mocha + ts-node) npx mocha --require ts-node/register test/parity.test.ts # surface-parity proof node cli.js scan corpus/rules/vibe-no-rate-limit/tp --json --enable-experimental cd web && npm ci && npm run dev # landing + dashboard + docs → localhost:3000 ``` VS Code extension: `F5` in VS Code, or `npm run watch` + `code --extensionDevelopmentPath=.` --- ## Contributing Two paths: 1. **New rules** — read [`CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md`](CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md). The PR bot gates every submission: rule module + TP fixture (must fire) + FP fixture (must not fire) + docs page + pack registration. The bot is the first reviewer; humans review after it passes. 2. **Everything else** (CLI, MCP, extension, daemon, web, docs) — read [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md). Before opening a PR: ```bash npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json # type-check node scripts/validate-rule-pr.js # rule-PR bot equivalent (must report "passed") node scripts/measure-accuracy.js # corpus regression (must stay 100% TP / 100% FP) npm run test:unit # full unit suite ``` Found a false positive? [Open a rule-FP report](.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE) — FP reports directly feed the beta→stable promotion pipeline. **Security findings:** do **not** open a public issue — use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow ([`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)). --- ## Roadmap - VS Code Marketplace + MCP registry listings - Demo video: open a real vibe-coded app, scan, hand the report to Claude Code, watch every BLOCKER close - 50-app benchmark study with published dataset - Telemetry-driven rule auto-demotion (nightly workflow) - JetBrains plugin · cross-language taint tracking (research) Details: [`docs/roadmap.md`](docs/roadmap.md). --- ## License MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE). CodeMore is open source from line one and stays that way. The wedge is the report contract, not gatekeeping. --- <div align="center"> **The static analyzer your AI agent reads.** [Website](https://codemore.tech) · [Docs](https://codemore.tech/docs) · [Rules](https://codemore.tech/docs/rules) · [Schema](https://codemore.tech/docs/schema) · [npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/codemore) · [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) </div>