Content

<img src="docs/assets/logo.png" alt="RedAmon Logo" width="120"/> <img src="docs/assets/title.svg" alt="RedAmon" width="340"/> <big><big>Unmask the hidden before the world does</big></big> An autonomous AI framework that chains reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-exploitation into a single pipeline, then goes further by triaging every finding, implementing code fixes, and opening pull requests on your repository. From first packet to merged patch, with human oversight at every critical step. <a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/21794?utm_source=trendshift-badge&utm_medium=badge&utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-21794" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/21794/daily?language=Python" alt="samugit83%2Fredamon | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a> <a href="https://www.redamon.org/"><img height="34" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/🌐_Website-redamon.org-A01025?style=for-the-badge&labelColor=000000" alt="RedAmon Website"/></a> <a href="https://discord.gg/5Zyff6PrUF"><img height="34" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-Join_Community-5865F2?style=for-the-badge&logo=discord&logoColor=white&labelColor=000000" alt="Discord Community"/></a> <a href="https://t.me/redamon_ai"><img height="34" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-Join_Channel-26A5E4?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=white&labelColor=000000" alt="Telegram Channel"/></a> <a href="https://youtu.be/XJyQHa4RTbI"><img height="34" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/YouTube-Platform_Tour-FF0000?style=for-the-badge&logo=youtube&logoColor=white&labelColor=000000" alt="RedAmon Platform Tour"/></a> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/stargazers"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/samugit83/redamon?style=flat&color=2E8B57&label=Stars" alt="GitHub Stars"/></a> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/v6.24.2-release-2E8B57?style=flat" alt="Version 6.24.2"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/WARNING-SECURITY%20TOOL-B22222?style=flat" alt="Security Tool Warning"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/LICENSE-MIT-4169A1?style=flat" alt="MIT License"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/AI-AUTONOMOUS%20AGENT-6A5ACD?style=flat&logo=openai&logoColor=white" alt="AI Powered"/> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Gauntlet"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%F0%9F%86%95%20AI%20GAUNTLET-OFFENSIVE%20AI%20TESTING-FF6B35?style=flat" alt="AI Gauntlet — Offensive AI Testing"/></a> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Fireteam-Parallel-Specialists"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%F0%9F%94%A5%20FIRETEAM-PARALLEL%20MULTI--AGENT-7C3AED?style=flat" alt="Fireteam Parallel Multi-Agent"/></a> <a href="redamon.wiki/Deploying-to-a-Server.md"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%F0%9F%9A%80%20ONE%20COMMAND-DEPLOY%20ON%20SERVER-CC7722?style=flat" alt="One Command Deploy on Server"/></a> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/TrafficMind"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%F0%9F%95%B8%20TRAFFICMIND-mitmproxy%20CAPTURE-1F6FEB?style=flat" alt="TrafficMind mitmproxy HTTP Capture"/></a> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/100+-SECURITY%20TOOLS-CC8F00?style=flat&logo=hack-the-box&logoColor=white" alt="100+ Security Tools"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/185,000+-DETECTION%20RULES-8B1142?style=flat" alt="185,000+ Detection Rules"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/400+-AI%20MODELS-04A878?style=flat&logo=huggingface&logoColor=white" alt="400+ AI Models"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Metasploit-Framework-1A6DAA?style=flat" alt="Metasploit Framework"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/OpenVAS-Scanner-66B245?style=flat" alt="OpenVAS Scanner"/> <img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/CypherFix-Auto%20Remediation-00B894?style=flat" alt="CypherFix Auto Remediation"/> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/📖_WIKI-FULL%20DOCUMENTATION-1A73E8?style=flat" alt="Wiki Documentation"/></a> > **LEGAL DISCLAIMER**: This tool is intended for **authorized security testing**, **educational purposes**, and **research only**. Never use this system to scan, probe, or attack any system you do not own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized access is **illegal** and punishable by law. By using this tool, you accept **full responsibility** for your actions. **[Read Full Disclaimer](DISCLAIMER.md)** > 🏆 **Flagship result:** RedAmon solves **101 / 104 (97.1%)** of the XBOW web-security benchmark **fully black-box**. Every solve ships a complete, unedited raw agent session **and** a reproducible, step-by-step walkthrough: open any row and read exactly how the flag fell, tool call by tool call. Auditable, line by line. See the **[XBOW Validation Benchmark scorecard](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/XBOW-Validation-Benchmark)**. > 📊 **Coverage, measured and self-scored:** the **[Bug Bounty Coverage — The Full Taxonomy Audit (PDF, 124 pages)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wiki/samugit83/redamon/docs/RedAmon_Bug_Bounty_Coverage.pdf)** audits RedAmon against all **397** classes of web bug-bounty finding, one line at a time, naming the exact module, skill or scanner behind every verdict, and scoring the recon pipeline and the agentic system separately against their own remit. It is deliberately self-critical, it records what is missing as plainly as what is covered: **134** classes complete, **210** in the build backlog, **44** deliberately excluded, with one explicit decision for every class. <img src="docs/assets/agent.gif" alt="RedAmon Agent Demo" width="100%"/> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKBUWnoi9aaA"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/YouTube-Demos-FF0000?style=flat&logo=youtube&logoColor=white" alt="YouTube - Demos"/></a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLXp03AyYNPWE"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/YouTube-XBOW_Bench-FF0000?style=flat&logo=youtube&logoColor=white" alt="YouTube - XBOW Bench"/></a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_HcrMfo9rCc7HaWIGk-J1YZRPQXSfPIi"><img height="24" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/YouTube-Hacklab-FF0000?style=flat&logo=youtube&logoColor=white" alt="YouTube - Hacklab"/></a> <h2 align="center">Dynamic Multi-Tool Parallel Recon Pipeline</h2> <img src="docs/assets/recon-pipeline.gif" alt="Parallel recon pipeline in action" width="100%"/> RedAmon launches multiple reconnaissance tools in parallel, each feeding results into a shared knowledge graph in real time. Tools spin up, adapt their scope based on live discoveries, and coordinate without manual intervention. The entire attack surface -- subdomains, ports, endpoints, parameters -- materializes in minutes, not hours. <h2 align="center">Recon as a Living Knowledge Graph</h2> <img src="docs/assets/redamon-graph.gif" alt="RedAmon Neo4j attack-surface graph rendered in 2D" width="100%"/> Industry-standard scanners chained so each tool's output feeds the next, then merged into a single Neo4j knowledge graph. Findings are deduplicated, relationships are explicit, and the agent inherits a structured, fully connected attack surface ready to query in natural language. <h1 align="center">Offense meets defense. One pipeline, full visibility.</h1> <samp><big>Reconnaissance ➜ Exploitation ➜ Post-Exploitation ➜ AI Triage ➜ CodeFix Agent ➜ GitHub PR</big></samp> RedAmon doesn't stop at finding vulnerabilities, it fixes them. The pipeline starts with a 6-phase reconnaissance engine that maps your target's entire attack surface, then hands control to an autonomous AI agent that validates CVE exploitability, tests credential policies, and maps lateral movement paths. Every finding is recorded in a Neo4j knowledge graph. When the offensive phase completes, CypherFix takes over: an AI triage agent correlates hundreds of findings, deduplicates them, and ranks them by exploitability. Then a CodeFix agent clones your repository, navigates the codebase with 11 code-aware tools, implements targeted fixes, and opens a GitHub pull request, ready for review and merge. <img src="docs/assets/cypherfix.gif" alt="CypherFix demo" width="100%"/> --- ## Roadmap & Community Contributions We maintain a public **[Project Board](https://github.com/users/samugit83/projects/1)** with upcoming features open for community contributions. Pick a task and submit a PR! > **Want to contribute?** See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for how to get started. ### Maintainers <table> <tr> <td align="center" valign="top" width="50%"> <img src="docs/assets/samuele.png" alt="Samuele Giampieri" width="120"/> Samuele Giampieri: Creator, Maintainer & AI Platform Architect AI Platform Architect & Full-Stack Lead with 15+ years of freelancing experience and more than 30 projects shipped to production, including enterprise-scale AI agentic systems. AWS-certified (DevOps Engineer, ML Specialty) and IBM-certified AI Engineer. Designs end-to-end ML solutions spanning deep learning, NLP, Computer Vision, and AI Agent systems with LangChain/LangGraph. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/samuele-giampieri-b1b67597/">LinkedIn</a> · <a href="https://github.com/samugit83">GitHub</a> · <a href="https://www.devergolabs.com/">Devergo Labs</a> <a href="https://pathbreak.io/"><img src="docs/assets/pathbreak.png" alt="Pathbreak - Agentic Cloud Security" width="90"/></a> From the same creator: <a href="https://pathbreak.io/">Pathbreak - Agentic Cloud Security</a> See the attack path. Then break it. Pathbreak is an agentic cloud security platform that discovers and validates the real attack paths a threat actor would exploit across your cloud. It catches the control-plane chains most tools miss. <a href="https://pathbreak.io/">Pathbreak - agentic cloud security</a> pathbreak.io </td> <td align="center" valign="top" width="50%"> <img src="docs/assets/ritesh.png" alt="Ritesh Gohil" width="120"/> Ritesh Gohil: Maintainer & Lead Security Researcher Cyber Security Engineer at Workday with over 7 years of experience in Web, API, Mobile, Network, and Cloud penetration testing. Published 11 CVEs in MITRE, with security acknowledgements from Google (4×) and Apple (6×). Secured 200+ web and mobile applications and contributed to Exploit Database, Google Hacking Database, and the AWS Community. Holds AWS Security Specialty, eWPTXv2, eCPPTv2, CRTP, and CEH certifications with expertise in red teaming, cloud security, CVE research, and security architecture review. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/riteshgohil25/">LinkedIn</a> · <a href="https://github.com/L4stPL4Y3R">GitHub</a> </td> </tr> </table> > **Anthropic Cyber Verification Program:** the team behind RedAmon is approved under Anthropic's **[Cyber Verification Program](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/14604842-real-time-cyber-safeguards-on-claude-opus-and-sonnet)**. --- ## Quick Start ### Prerequisites - [Docker](https://docs.docker.com/get-docker/) & Docker Compose v2+ - **macOS:** Docker Desktop, with Memory raised to at least 4 GB (8 GB with `--gvm`) in Settings → Resources. Clone under `~/` so the path is inside the default File Sharing list. - **Windows:** Docker Desktop with the WSL2 backend, run from inside the WSL2 filesystem (`~/`), not `/mnt/c/`. That's it. No Node.js, Python, or security tools needed on your host. #### Minimum System Requirements | Resource | Without OpenVAS | With OpenVAS (full stack) | |----------|----------------|--------------------------| | **CPU** | 2 cores | 4 cores | | **RAM** | 4 GB | 8 GB (16 GB recommended) | | **Disk** | 80 GB free | 110 GB free | > **Without OpenVAS** runs 7 containers: webapp, postgres, neo4j, agent, kali-sandbox, recon-orchestrator, and docker-broker (a filtering Docker-socket proxy that the recon orchestrator's spawned scan containers go through, so they can only launch the known tool images). > **With OpenVAS** adds 4 more runtime containers (gvmd, ospd-openvas, gvm-postgres, gvm-redis) plus ~8 one-shot data-init containers for vulnerability feeds (~170K+ NVTs). First launch takes ~30 minutes for GVM feed synchronization. > Dynamic recon and scan containers are spawned on-demand during operations and require additional resources. > **Disk sizing for a real deployment.** The figures above are bare minimums to build and run the stack (fixed platform footprint: ~70 GB without OpenVAS, ~95 GB with - measured by true on-disk image size after deduplicating the shared Kali base layers). For an **always-on server running real engagements**, add **~100 GB of free space for operational data** - the Neo4j attack graph, scan artifacts/outputs, Postgres, and container logs all grow with use. That means **200 GB without OpenVAS, 250 GB with OpenVAS**, each leaving well over 100 GB free for operations. See the [deployment guide](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Deploying-to-a-Server) for the full breakdown. ### 1. Clone & Install ```bash git clone https://github.com/samugit83/redamon.git cd redamon # Without GVM (lighter, faster startup): ./redamon.sh install # With GVM / OpenVAS (full stack, ~30 min first run): ./redamon.sh install --gvm ``` The script builds all images and starts the services. ### 2. Create Admin Account At the end of the install (and on every `./redamon.sh up` or `./redamon.sh update` if no admin exists), you will be prompted in the terminal: ``` [WARN] No admin user found. Let's create one. Admin name: Your Name Admin email: admin@example.com Admin password: ******** Confirm password: ******** ``` - **Admin name** -- display name shown in the UI (e.g. `Admin`, your name, anything you want). - **Admin email** -- used to log in at `http://localhost:3000/login`. - **Admin password** -- minimum 12 characters. After creation, open **http://localhost:3000** and sign in with the email and password you just set. > **No prompt appeared?** On a heavy first boot (especially `--gvm`, or a small VM) the webapp can take a while to come up, so the automatic prompt may be skipped. Create the admin at any time with: > > ```bash > ./redamon.sh create-admin > ``` > > It waits for the webapp, then prompts for the same details. It is safe to re-run: reusing an existing admin's email resets that password, a new email adds another admin. **What the admin can do:** - Switch between all users via the user dropdown in the header (including users without a password). - Create new users (with or without a password) and assign them `admin` or `standard` roles. - Set or change any user's password. - Delete users (except themselves). - Access the **Users** management page from the header navigation. **Standard users** can only log in (if they have a password set by an admin), change their own password, and use the app within their own scope. They cannot switch users, create users, or access user management. If you forget the admin password, reset it from the terminal: ```bash ./redamon.sh reset-password # reset an EXISTING user's password ./redamon.sh create-admin # create the first admin, or reset an admin by re-entering its email ``` Use `create-admin` when no admin exists yet (it upserts on email); `reset-password` only updates a user that already exists. ### 3. Configure Open **http://localhost:3000/settings** (gear icon in the header) to configure everything. No `.env` file is needed. - **LLM Providers** -- add API keys for OpenAI, Anthropic, OpenRouter, AWS Bedrock, or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint (Ollama, vLLM, Groq, etc.). Each provider can be tested before saving. The model selector in project settings **dynamically fetches** available models from configured providers. - **API Keys** -- Tavily, Shodan, SerpAPI, NVD, Vulners, URLScan, and threat intelligence keys (Censys, FOFA, OTX, Netlas, VirusTotal, ZoomEye, CriminalIP) to enable extended agent capabilities (web search, OSINT, CVE lookups, passive threat intel). **Uncover multi-engine search** keys (Quake, Hunter, PublicWWW, HunterHow, Google, Onyphe, Driftnet) expand target discovery across 13 search engines -- shared keys (Shodan, Censys, FOFA, etc.) are automatically reused. Supports **key rotation** -- configure multiple keys per tool with automatic round-robin rotation to avoid rate limits. - **Tunneling** -- configure ngrok or chisel for reverse shell tunneling. Changes apply immediately without container restarts. All settings are stored per-user in the database. See the **[AI Model Providers](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Model-Providers)** wiki page for detailed setup instructions. ### 4. Open the Webapp Go to **http://localhost:3000** -- create a project, configure your target, and start scanning. > For a detailed walkthrough of every feature, check the **[Wiki](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki)**. > > Prefer video? Watch the **[Product Demos playlist](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKBUWnoi9aaA)** on YouTube for step-by-step tutorials. > > Having issues? See the **[Troubleshooting](docs/readmes/TROUBLESHOOTING.md)** guide or the **[Wiki Troubleshooting](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Troubleshooting)** page. ### Management Commands All lifecycle management is handled by a single script: | Command | Description | |---------|-------------| | `./redamon.sh install` | Build + start lightweight (no GVM, no Knowledge Base, Tavily-only web search) | | `./redamon.sh install --kbase` | Build + start with the local Knowledge Base (~4.4 GB heavier) | | `./redamon.sh install --gvm` | Build + start with GVM/OpenVAS | > Flags can be combined: `./redamon.sh install --gvm --kbase` | Command | Description | |---------|-------------| | **`./redamon.sh update`** | **Pull latest version, smart-rebuild only changed services (preserves your install-time GVM/KB choice)** | | `./redamon.sh up` | Start services (auto-detects GVM and KB mode from install) | | `./redamon.sh up dev` | Start in dev mode with hot-reload (auto-detects GVM and KB mode) | | `./redamon.sh down` | Stop services (preserves data) | | `./redamon.sh status` | Show running services, version, GVM mode, KB state | | `./redamon.sh clean` | Remove containers + images, keep data | | `./redamon.sh create-admin` | Create the admin login (or reset it) -- use if no prompt appeared at install | | `./redamon.sh reset-password` | Reset an existing user's password from the terminal | | `./redamon.sh supply-chain-sync [ecosystems]` | Populate the offline OSV database for the supply-chain feature (default: `npm`; e.g. `npm PyPI Go`) | | `./redamon.sh purge` | Remove everything including all data | ### Updating to a New Version Just run: ```bash ./redamon.sh update ``` The script pulls the latest code from GitHub, detects which Dockerfiles and source files changed, rebuilds only the affected images, and restarts the updated services. Your databases, scan results, and reports are preserved -- volumes are never deleted. > **One-time note when a release adds a new background service.** `update` re-execs the freshly-pulled script so new build/start rules apply automatically -- but only for the script version you are updating *from*. When updating *from a version that predates this self-heal* (i.e. your first update onto it), run `./redamon.sh up` once right after `update` so any newly added core service is started: > > ```bash > ./redamon.sh update && ./redamon.sh up > ``` > > `up` is idempotent -- it starts only what is missing and leaves running containers untouched. After this one-time step, plain `./redamon.sh update` handles everything on its own. > **Upgrading across 6.9 (repository reorganization).** 6.9 grouped the top-level directories under `scanners/`, `services/`, `testing/`, `tooling/` and `docs/`. `git pull` moves only tracked files, so data that git does not track -- the knowledge-base index, past scan outputs, and the single-host deploy `.env` and TLS material -- would otherwise be left behind at the old paths. `update` (and `up`/`status`) migrate it for you automatically and print what moved. If any file was written by a container as root and could not be moved, finish it with: > > ```bash > sudo ./redamon.sh migrate-layout > ``` The webapp also checks for updates automatically and shows a notification in the UI when a new version is available. ### Deploy to a Server (Production) The Quick Start above runs RedAmon locally on `localhost`. To run a shared, internet-reachable instance on a Linux server (EC2, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, or bare metal), use the **single-host deploy** in [`tooling/deploy/single-host/`](tooling/deploy/single-host/). It drives `redamon.sh` over SSH from your laptop and wraps the stack in the internet-facing security layer RedAmon omits by default: nginx + TLS (Let's Encrypt), a host firewall, SSH hardening, and fail2ban, with a single public HTTPS origin so only the login page is reachable and everything else stays bound to loopback. ```bash cd tooling/deploy/single-host cp .env.example .env # set HOST_IP, DOMAIN, SSH_KEY_PATH, OPERATOR_ALLOW_CIDRS, # LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL, ADMIN_* ... ./deploy.sh init # first build takes 30-60 min, then log in at https://<domain>/ ``` Full walkthrough: [Wiki: Deploying to a Server](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Deploying-to-a-Server). Complete reference: [tooling/deploy/single-host/README.md](tooling/deploy/single-host/README.md). ### Development Mode For contributors and active development with **Next.js fast refresh**: ```bash ./redamon.sh up dev # auto-detects GVM mode from install ``` Tool images are built automatically on first run if they don't exist yet. The dev override swaps the production webapp image for a dev container with your source code volume-mounted. Every file save triggers instant hot-reload in the browser. #### When to Rebuild vs Restart | What changed | Action needed | |-------------|---------------| | `webapp/src/` (frontend code) | Nothing -- Next.js hot-reload handles it in dev mode | | `agentic/*.py` (agent Python code) | `docker compose build agent && docker compose up -d agent` (source is baked into the image, so `restart` alone won't pick up `.py` changes) | | `recon_orchestrator/*.py` | `docker compose restart recon-orchestrator` | | `mcp/servers/*.py` (MCP servers) | `docker compose restart kali-sandbox` | | `agentic/Dockerfile` or `agentic/requirements.txt` | `docker compose build agent && docker compose up -d agent` | | `recon_orchestrator/Dockerfile` or its `requirements.txt` | `docker compose build recon-orchestrator && docker compose up -d recon-orchestrator` | | `mcp/kali-sandbox/Dockerfile` | `docker compose build kali-sandbox && docker compose up -d kali-sandbox` | | `webapp/Dockerfile` or `webapp/package.json` | `docker compose build webapp && docker compose up -d webapp` | | `recon/Dockerfile` | `docker compose --profile tools build recon` | | `scanners/gvm_scan/Dockerfile` | `docker compose --profile tools build vuln-scanner` | | `scanners/github_secret_hunt/Dockerfile` | `docker compose --profile tools build github-secret-hunter` | | `scanners/trufflehog_scan/Dockerfile` (Secret Multiscanner) | `docker compose --profile tools build trufflehog-scanner` | | `scanners/baddns_scan/Dockerfile` or `scanners/baddns_scan/entrypoint.sh` | `docker compose --profile tools build baddns-scanner` | | `scanners/wcvs/Dockerfile` (web cache poisoning engine) | `docker compose --profile tools build wcvs` | | `scanners/supply_chain_scan/Dockerfile` (L1 scanner) | `docker compose --profile tools build supply-chain` | | `scanners/supply_chain_analyzer/` (DIRTY analyzer; entrypoint is baked) | `docker compose --profile tools build supply-chain-analyzer` | | `docker-compose.yml` | `docker compose up -d` (re-creates affected containers) | | `prisma/schema.prisma` | `docker compose exec webapp npx prisma db push` | **Rebuild a single service:** ```bash docker compose build <service> # Rebuild one image docker compose up -d --no-deps <service> # Restart only that service ``` **Common dev commands:** ```bash docker compose ps # Check service status docker compose logs -f <service> # Follow logs for a service docker compose down # Stop all (preserves volumes) docker compose --profile tools down --rmi local # Remove built images docker compose --profile tools down --rmi local --volumes --remove-orphans # Full cleanup ``` **Reclaim disk space:** ```bash docker system df # Show Docker disk usage (add -v for per-image breakdown) docker image prune -f # Remove dangling images (auto-run by `./redamon.sh install` and `update`) docker builder prune -f # Drop unused build cache (auto-run after every successful build; opt out with REDAMON_NO_AUTO_PRUNE=1) docker builder prune -af # Drop ALL build cache, including what the current images reuse -- frees no extra disk and makes the next rebuild cold docker container prune -f # Remove stopped containers ``` > For a complete development reference -- hot-reload rules, common commands, important rules, and AI-assisted coding guidelines -- see the **[Developer Guide](docs/readmes/README.DEV.md)**. --- ### Knowledge Base (RAG-Enhanced Web Search) The agent's `web_search` tool includes a local **Knowledge Base** -- a RAG pipeline that searches curated security datasets (GTFOBins, LOLBAS, OWASP WSTG, NVD CVEs, ExploitDB, Nuclei templates, and agent skill docs) before falling back to Tavily web search. When the KB returns a high-confidence match, Tavily is skipped entirely for faster, offline-capable results. **How it works:** When the KB is enabled, `install` / `up` / `update` builds a lightweight KB index (~1,200 chunks in 10-15 min on CPU). At query time, the agent runs a hybrid retrieval pipeline (FAISS vector search + Neo4j fulltext), reranks with a cross-encoder, and checks a confidence threshold. If the score is high enough, results come from the local KB. Otherwise, it falls back to Tavily or merges both. **Default behavior:** The KB is **opt-in**. `./redamon.sh install` produces a lightweight install (~4.4 GB lighter, Tavily-only web search). To enable the local KB, pass `--kbase`: ```bash ./redamon.sh install --kbase ``` On first install with `--kbase`, RedAmon detects your hardware (GPU / CPU / API) and offers a quick-start profile. The choice is persisted, so subsequent `update` / `up` commands respect it without re-passing the flag. **Speed up ingestion with API embeddings:** By default, embeddings run locally on CPU/GPU. On CPU-only machines, large datasets (ExploitDB, NVD) can take hours. You can offload embedding to an external API by creating a `.env` file from the template: ```bash cp .env.example .env ``` Then configure the embedding API in `.env`: | Variable | Default | Description | |----------|---------|-------------| | `KB_EMBEDDING_USE_API` | `false` | Set to `true` to use API-based embeddings instead of local model | | `KB_EMBEDDING_API_BASE_URL` | *(empty = OpenAI)* | Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint (Ollama, vLLM, LiteLLM, Together AI, Azure) | | `KB_EMBEDDING_API_KEY` | *(empty)* | API key for the embedding provider | | `KB_EMBEDDING_API_MODEL` | `text-embedding-3-small` | Model name (provider-specific) | | `NVD_API_KEY` | *(empty)* | Free NVD API key for 10x faster CVE ingestion | Example with Ollama (free, local, no API key cost): ```bash KB_EMBEDDING_USE_API=true KB_EMBEDDING_API_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:11434/v1 KB_EMBEDDING_API_KEY=ollama KB_EMBEDDING_API_MODEL=nomic-embed-text ``` > **Important:** Ingestion and query must use the same model. If you switch models, rebuild the index: `make -C services/knowledge_base kb-rebuild-lite MODE=docker` **Manage the KB:** ```bash ./redamon.sh kb build lite # Build with lite profile (~30-60s with API) ./redamon.sh kb build standard # Add NVD CVEs ./redamon.sh kb update nvd # Incremental NVD refresh ./redamon.sh kb stats # Show index statistics ./redamon.sh kb rebuild lite # Wipe and rebuild from scratch ``` > For full technical documentation -- query pipeline, data sources, ingestion profiles, scoring, security model -- see the **[Knowledge Base Technical Reference](docs/readmes/README.KBASE.md)** or the **[Wiki: Knowledge Base & Web Search](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Knowledge-Base-Web-Search)**. --- ## Table of Contents - [Full Wiki Documentation](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki) - [Overview](#overview) - [Built for Enterprise, Secure by Design](#built-for-enterprise-secure-by-design) - [Security & Threat Model](#security--threat-model) - [Feature Highlights](#feature-highlights) - [System Architecture](#system-architecture) - [Components](#components) - [Documentation](#documentation) - [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) - [RedAmon HackLab](#redamon-hacklab) - [Community Showcase](#community-showcase) - [Legal](#legal) --- ## Overview RedAmon is a modular, containerized penetration testing framework that chains automated reconnaissance, AI-driven exploitation, and graph-powered intelligence into a single, end-to-end offensive security pipeline. Every component runs inside Docker (no tools installed on your host) and communicates through well-defined APIs so each layer can evolve independently. The platform is built around six pillars: | Pillar | What it does | |--------|-------------| | **Reconnaissance Pipeline** | A **parallelized fan-out / fan-in** scanning pipeline that maps your target's entire attack surface (starting from a single domain, **IP addresses / CIDR ranges**, or a **Domain batch** of many domains scanned in turn) from subdomain discovery (5 concurrent tools) through port scanning, Nmap service detection and NSE vulnerability scripts, HTTP probing, resource enumeration, and vulnerability detection. Independent modules run concurrently via `ThreadPoolExecutor`, graph DB updates happen in a background thread, and results are stored as a rich, queryable graph. Complemented by standalone GVM network scanning, GitHub secret hunting, and Secret Multiscanner deep secret scanning modules. | | **AI Agent Orchestrator** | A LangGraph-based autonomous agent that reasons about the graph, selects security tools via MCP, transitions through informational / exploitation / post-exploitation phases, and can be steered in real-time via chat. | | **Attack Surface Graph** | A Neo4j knowledge graph with 17 node types and 20+ relationship types that serves as the single source of truth for every finding, and the primary data source the AI agent queries before every decision. | | **EvoGraph** | A persistent, evolutionary attack chain graph in Neo4j that tracks every step, finding, decision, and failure across the attack lifecycle, bridging the recon graph and enabling cross-session intelligence accumulation. | | **CypherFix** | Automated vulnerability remediation pipeline: one triage run scores every finding from the graph with a fixed risk model, groups the ones that share a fix, has an LLM check the evidence behind each, and writes one fix item per group. A CodeFix agent then clones the target repository, implements a fix using a ReAct loop with 11 code tools, and opens a GitHub pull request. | | **Project Settings Engine** | 500+ per-project parameters (exposed through the webapp UI) that control every tool's behavior, from Naabu thread counts to Nuclei severity filters to agent approval gates. | --- ## Built for Enterprise, Secure by Design RedAmon is engineered to drop into a real security organization, not just a researcher's laptop. - **Secure by design, STRIDE threat-modeled.** The whole platform is assessed end to end under STRIDE and hardened in independently verified waves: code-level privilege separation, a filtering Docker broker in front of the host socket, fail-closed auth, SSRF egress guards, secret redaction, append-only audit trails, and a non-disableable guardrail that blocks government, military, and intergovernmental targets. See the [Security Posture](docs/readmes/README.SECURITY_POSTURE.md) and [Threat Model](docs/readmes/README.TM.SYSTEM_OVERVIEW.md). - **Fully isolated and containerized.** Every tool, scanner, and agent runs in its own container with no host-level execution. Scan jobs are spawned as ephemeral sibling containers with their own filesystem and network namespace, then torn down on completion, keeping the host clean and containing the blast radius of any exploit. - **Governed and multi-tenant.** Multi-user / multi-project tenancy with admin and standard roles, DB-level `user_id + project_id` scoping on every node, Rules-of-Engagement enforcement, human-in-the-loop approval gates, and 500+ per-project settings give teams the control an enterprise engagement requires. **Deploy to a server in one command.** Beyond local `localhost`, RedAmon ships a hardened [single-host deploy](tooling/deploy/single-host/) that stands up a shared, internet-reachable instance and wraps the stack in nginx + TLS (Let's Encrypt), a host firewall, SSH hardening, and fail2ban, exposing a single public HTTPS origin: ```bash cd tooling/deploy/single-host cp .env.example .env # set DOMAIN, HOST_IP, SSH_KEY_PATH, ADMIN_* ... ./deploy.sh init # builds the full stack and brings it up over SSH ``` Full walkthrough: [Wiki: Deploying to a Server](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Deploying-to-a-Server). --- ## Security & Threat Model RedAmon is offensive software, so we hold it to the standard it tests others by. It is engineered **secure by design** and has been assessed end to end under the **STRIDE** methodology (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege), with findings remediated in sequenced, independently verified waves. This is not a marketing claim. It is grounded in a published, evidence-based analysis you can read: - **[Security Posture](docs/readmes/README.SECURITY_POSTURE.md)** - the full defense-in-depth control catalog: every layer implemented, mapped to the code. - **[Threat Model](docs/readmes/README.TM.SYSTEM_OVERVIEW.md)** - the assets, trust boundaries, data flows, entry points, and network surface the analysis was built on. Highlights of what is implemented: - **Code-level privilege separation.** The target-facing worker is the least trusted component and holds no secrets; a filtering docker-broker stands between the orchestrator and the host Docker socket (image allowlist, denies `--privileged`, host-root binds, dangerous capabilities). - **Two deployment postures, one trust model.** Local (backends bound to loopback) and a hardened [public-internet deploy](tooling/deploy/single-host/) that adds nginx + TLS, an operator gate, login rate-limiting, and a single public origin. - **Fail-closed by default.** Unset auth tokens reject rather than serve, default database credentials are refused and rotated, WebSockets require a signed ticket plus a server-side same-origin check, and every request is scoped to its authenticated owner (per-user access control with anti-enumeration 404s). - **Defense in depth.** SSRF egress guards, secret redaction in logs, append-only audit trails, container-escape hardening, decompression and concurrency caps, and supply-chain pinning (sha256 + commit pins). - **A non-disableable hard guardrail** blocks government, military, and intergovernmental targets regardless of configuration. - **Verified, release-gated remediation.** Fixes ship in sequenced waves, each independently verified with live exploit reproduction before and after the patch. See the [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) security entries. Found a vulnerability? See our [Security Policy](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure. --- ## Feature Highlights ### Reconnaissance Pipeline A fully automated, end-to-end **external attack-surface mapper** running inside a Kali Linux container. Give it one input (a root domain, a subdomain list, IP/CIDR ranges, or a Domain batch: a list of hostnames grouped by domain and scanned one group after another into a single graph) and the pipeline returns a complete, structured picture of the target: every subdomain, every live host, every open port, every HTTP service with its technology stack, every crawled endpoint and discovered parameter, every CVE the target is likely vulnerable to, plus dedicated scanners for **GraphQL APIs**, **subdomain takeovers**, **hidden virtual hosts** behind reverse proxies, **web cache poisoning & deception**, and an **Adversarial AI Surface** layer that tags AI runtimes / vector DBs / LLM frontends / proxies / MCP servers / chat / completion / embedding / RAG endpoints and prompt-injectable parameters using header / favicon / title / path / parameter-name signatures, then **actively confirms** them with a dedicated **AI Surface Recon** module (benign chat-shape probes, MCP handshake + tool-poisoning scan, vector-DB reads — no LLM calls). Everything runs on a **fan-out / fan-in** architecture: each phase fires as many tools in parallel as the work allows, then converges before the next phase begins. **40+ industry tools** integrate into one coordinated workflow, wildcard DNS poisoning is filtered out automatically with puredns, and **stealth mode** keeps the entire pipeline running on passive sources only when active probing is off-limits. Findings stream into the **Neo4j knowledge graph** on a background thread so the scan never blocks on database writes, and the raw JSON is preserved for download. The detailed tool-by-tool breakdown is in the matrix below. > **[Wiki: Running Reconnaissance](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Running-Reconnaissance)** | **[Technical: README.RECON.md](docs/readmes/README.RECON.md)** <img src="docs/assets/recon.gif" alt="RedAmon Reconnaissance Pipeline" width="100%"/> #### Recon Pipeline Tool Matrix | Settings Tab | Phase | Tools | Type | Execution | |:-----:|-------|-------|:----:|-----------| | **Discovery & OSINT** | **Subdomain Discovery** | crt.sh, HackerTarget, Subfinder, Amass, Knockpy | Passive* | 5 tools parallel | | | **Wildcard Filtering** | Puredns | Active | Sequential | | | **WHOIS + URLScan** | python-whois, URLScan.io API | Passive | Parallel | | | **DNS Resolution** | dnspython | Passive | 20 parallel workers | | | **OSINT Enrichment** | Shodan / InternetDB | Passive | Parallel with port scan | | | **Uncover Expansion** | ProjectDiscovery Uncover (13 engines: Shodan, Censys, FOFA, ZoomEye, Netlas, CriminalIP, Quake, Hunter, PublicWWW, HunterHow, Google, Onyphe, Driftnet) | Passive | Before port scan (GROUP 2b) | | | **Threat Intel Enrichment** | Censys, FOFA, OTX (AlienVault), Netlas, VirusTotal, ZoomEye, CriminalIP | Passive | 7 tools parallel (GROUP 3b) | | **Port Scanning** | **Port Scanning** | Masscan, Naabu | Active / Passive | Both parallel (Naabu supports passive InternetDB mode) | | **Nmap Service Detection** | **Service Version Detection** | Nmap (-sV, --script vuln) | Active | Sequential per target | | **Port Scanning** | **TLS Certificate Grab** | tlsx: one handshake per open **non-HTTP** port (SMTPS 465, IMAPS 993, POP3S 995, LDAPS 636, FTPS 990, and any odd TLS port the port scan found), capturing issuer / SAN / validity / posture where httpx only reaches the five HTTPS ports it dials. In-scope SAN hostnames feed back as scan targets (apex-scoped, resolve-checked); optional JARM / JA3 fingerprints and TLS version / cipher enumeration | Active | After Nmap, before HTTP probing so discovered hostnames become probe targets (GROUP 3.6) | | **HTTP Probing** | **HTTP Probing** | httpx | Active | Internal parallel | | | **Tech Detection** | Wappalyzer | Passive | Sequential (post-probe) | | | **Banner Grabbing** | Custom (Python sockets: SSH, FTP, SMTP, MySQL, etc.) | Active | Parallel workers | | **Resource Enum** | **Web Crawling** | Katana, Hakrawler | Active | Parallel | | | **Archive Discovery** | GAU (Wayback, CommonCrawl, OTX) | Passive | Parallel with crawlers | | | **Parameter Mining** | ParamSpider (Wayback CDX) | Passive | Parallel with crawlers | | | **JS Analysis** | jsluice | Active | Sequential (post-crawl) | | | **Directory Fuzzing** | FFuf | Active | Sequential (post-jsluice) | | | **Browser Crawling** | ZAP Ajax Spider | Active | Sequential (post-FFuf), per-seed Docker containers in parallel | | | **Parameter Discovery** | Arjun | Active / Passive | Methods parallel (GET/POST/JSON/XML) | | | **API Discovery** | Kiterunner | Active | Sequential per wordlist | | | **Endpoint AI Classifier** | Path + parameter classifier — tags `Endpoint.ai_interface_type` (`llm-chat`, `llm-completion`, `llm-embedding`, `llm-tool-call`, `sse-stream`, `mcp`, `llm-graphql`), `is_ai_rag_ingest`, `Parameter.is_ai_prompt_injectable` against catalogued AI signatures | Passive | Sequential (post-crawl) | | **JS Recon** | **JS Secret Detection** | 100 regex patterns + custom uploads | Passive | Parallel per file | | | **Key Validation** | 21 service validators (AWS, GitHub, Stripe, etc.) | Active | Rate-limited (1/sec/svc) | | | **Source Map Discovery** | Comment, header, path probing | Active | Per JS file | | | **Dependency Confusion** | npm registry check | Passive | Per scoped package | | | **Endpoint Extraction** | REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, router patterns | Passive | Per JS file | | | **Framework Fingerprinting** | 12 built-in + custom signatures | Passive | Per JS file | | | **DOM Sink Detection** | 17 XSS/prototype pollution patterns | Passive | Per JS file | | **Supply Chain Recon** | **Malicious Package Detection** | Black-box harvest of the npm package set the target serves (source-map `node_modules` mining + `import`/`require` + Wappalyzer technologies), synthesized into a CycloneDX SBOM and verdicted against the offline OSV database. Writes `Package` + `MalPackageFinding` nodes, anchored to `BaseURL` via `DEPENDS_ON`. No new fetches (parses JS-recon output) | Passive (offline) | Post-JS-recon (GROUP 5.5) | | **AI Surface Recon** | **AI/LLM/MCP/Vector-DB Fingerprinting** | Active confirmation of the surfaces the classifier flagged — chat-shape probes (dialect/streaming/latency), MCP handshake + `tools/list` + Cisco YARA tool-poisoning scan, OpenAPI/model-listing discovery, Julius YAML probe-pack engine, vector-DB confirmation reads (qdrant/chroma/weaviate/milvus). Writes `Endpoint.ai_*` / `ai_mcp_*`, `Parameter.is_ai_prompt_injectable`, confirmed `Technology(ai-*)`, and MCP tool-poisoning `Vulnerability` nodes | Active (benign, no LLM calls) | Hosts parallel, workloads sequential (GROUP 5c / Phase 4.5) | | **AI Gauntlet** | **Broad LLM Scan** | garak — 40 probe families (prompt injection, DAN jailbreaks, encoding bypass, data-leak replay, system-prompt extraction, toxicity, malware / exploit generation, package hallucination) | Active (offensive) | Offensive follow-up to recon; one-shot per probe, ASR per family, local-judge graded | | | **Multi-Turn Jailbreaks** | PyRIT — bounded conversational attacks (crescendo, skeleton-key, TAP, many-shot) | Active (offensive) | Multi-turn escalation, local attacker / judge model | | | **Quality + Safety Scan** | Giskard — app-tailored detectors (prompt injection, information disclosure, hallucination, harmfulness, stereotypes, sycophancy, output formatting) | Active (offensive) | Test set generated from the app purpose, local judge | | | **Red-Team Eval** | promptfoo — public attack datasets (Pliny, BeaverTails, HarmBench) + encoding strategies (base64, rot13, leetspeak, morse, pig latin) | Active (offensive) | Dataset eval, ASR per plugin, local judge | | **Vulnerability Scanning** | **Vulnerability Scanning** | Nuclei (9,000+ templates + DAST + custom template upload) | Active | Parallel with GraphQL Scan + Subdomain Takeover + VHost & SNI + Web Cache Poisoning + Origin Discovery (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **GraphQL Security** | **GraphQL Security Testing** | Endpoint discovery, introspection test, schema extraction, sensitive-field detection, graphql-cop (12 misconfig checks: alias/batch/directive DoS, GraphiQL, trace mode, GET/POST CSRF, field suggestions) | Active / Passive | Parallel with Nuclei + Subdomain Takeover + VHost & SNI + Web Cache Poisoning + Origin Discovery (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **Subdomain Takeover** | **Subdomain Takeover Detection** | Subjack (Apache-2.0 DNS-first fingerprints) + Nuclei takeover templates (`http/takeovers/` + `dns/`) + BadDNS (AGPL-3.0 isolated sidecar: CNAME, NS, MX, TXT, SPF, DMARC, wildcard, NSEC, references, zonetransfer). Cross-tool dedup, 12+ auto-exploitable providers, confidence-scored `confirmed` / `likely` / `manual_review` verdicts | Active / Passive | Parallel with Nuclei + GraphQL Scan + VHost & SNI + Web Cache Poisoning + Origin Discovery (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **VHost & SNI Enumeration** | **Hidden Virtual Host Discovery** | Curl-only dual-layer probing: L7 Host-header overrides + L4 TLS SNI swaps via `--resolve`, baseline-comparison anomaly detection, 4-tier severity ladder (`high` for L7/L4 routing inconsistency, `medium` for internal-keyword matches, `low`/`info` for status/size deltas), 2,471-entry default wordlist + custom + graph-derived candidates, discovery feedback loop into httpx | Active | Parallel with Nuclei + GraphQL Scan + Subdomain Takeover + Web Cache Poisoning + Origin Discovery (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **Web Cache Poisoning** | **Web Cache Poisoning & Deception** | Two-engine detection: WCVS (Hackmanit, Docker-in-Docker) breadth sweep across 10+ technique classes (unkeyed-header poisoning, parameter cloaking, path/cache-key normalization, cache-key injection, web cache deception) then a RedAmon-native 5-phase confirmation (cache oracle with silent-cache frozen-Date fallback, isolated cache-buster, fingerprint-gated framework packs for Next.js/Nuxt/Remix, baseline→poison→clean persistence check, reflected + non-reflective differential detection). Confidence-scored `Confirmed`/`Strong`/`Tentative` tiers, min-confidence gate; benign `.invalid` canaries + isolated cache buckets so the real cache is never poisoned. Disabled by default | Active | Parallel with Nuclei + GraphQL Scan + Subdomain Takeover + VHost & SNI + Origin Discovery (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **Origin Discovery** | **Origin-IP Discovery (CDN/WAF unmasking)** | Finds the real origin server hidden behind a CDN/WAF by pivoting on the fingerprints the origin leaks: 44 non-CDN subdomain names, SPF/MX record IPs, crt.sh SANs, the favicon hash (mmh3), internet-wide scanners (Shodan/Censys/FOFA/ZoomEye/OTX/VirusTotal), and passive-DNS history (SecurityTrails/ViewDNS). It then confirms each candidate by fetching it directly and with a forged `Host:` header, scoring HTML 60% + TLS cert 25% + headers 15% (± status) against the fronted site. Fail-closed SSRF / CDN-range / current-resolution / RoE filters before any probe; per-scan keyed-search budget; per-target cache; never-raise; converges with the WAF-bypass finding via a tenant-scoped id. Disabled by default | Active / Passive | Parallel with Nuclei + GraphQL Scan + Subdomain Takeover + VHost & SNI + Web Cache Poisoning (GROUP 6 Phase A) | | **Security Checks** | **Security Checks** | WAF bypass, direct IP access, TLS expiry, missing headers, cache-control | Active | Parallel workers | | **CVE & MITRE** | **CVE Enrichment** | NVD API, Vulners API | Passive | Sequential | | | **MITRE Enrichment** | CWE / CAPEC mapping | Passive | Sequential | *Amass can run in active mode when configured. Knockpy performs active DNS probing. #### Partial Recon Run **any single tool** from the pipeline independently without re-running the entire scan. Up to **12 partial recons can run in parallel** per project, each with independent logs, stop controls, and status badges visible in both the Graph toolbar and Project Settings header. Each tool section has a play button that opens a modal where you can review existing graph data, add custom targets (subdomains, IPs, ports, or URLs), and launch the tool in isolation. Results are merged back into the Neo4j graph using `MERGE` operations -- duplicates are updated, not recreated. The tool runs with all project settings (timeouts, wordlists, API keys, proxy) applied automatically. All pipeline tools support partial recon. > **[Wiki: Recon Pipeline Workflow -- Partial Recon](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Recon-Pipeline-Workflow#partial-recon)** #### AI in Pipeline Optional **LLM-augmented decision points** wired inside the recon pipeline where static look-ups historically drift -- **Nuclei** prunes its tag list to the detected tech stack, the **WAF classifier** catches header-stripped Cloudflare/AWS WAF/Imperva, and many others across FFuf, Nuclei false-positive filtering, and subdomain-takeover disambiguation. Each hook is a **cascade fallback** after the static path with a deterministic safe fallback, so an LLM outage cannot break a scan. One master toggle in the Target tab governs them all. The recon pipeline uses **TypeSafe Jev**, a typed decision model, for eight decisions: what kind of page each URL is, which host Hakrawler crawls first, which directories and extensions FFuf fuzzes, whether a tool failed or just found nothing, which Nuclei tags to run, whether a WAF is in front, and whether a takeover is real. Jev needs a token on the project owner's account; see how it works in the [Jev Meets the Recon Pipeline](https://www.redamon.org/jev-meets-the-recon-pipeline) walkthrough on redamon.org. > **[Wiki: TypeSafe Jev](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/TypeSafe-Jev)** > **[Wiki: AI in Pipeline](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Recon-Pipeline-Workflow#ai-in-pipeline)** ### AI Gauntlet: Offensive AI/LLM Testing Where the recon pipeline **finds** the AI surface, the **AI Gauntlet attacks it**. Pick the discovered LLM endpoints (or type a custom URL), choose a tool, confirm the Rules of Engagement, and launch: a short-lived container runs the target through four industry red-team tools -- **garak** (broad single-shot scanner, 40 probe families), **PyRIT** (bounded multi-turn jailbreaks), **Giskard** (LLM-assisted safety scan), and **promptfoo** (dataset red-team eval) -- measuring an **Attack Success Rate** per attack and writing the confirmed weaknesses back onto the graph as OWASP-LLM / MITRE-ATLAS-mapped `Vulnerability` findings with evidence transcripts. It is **deterministic** (seeds, fixed bounds, pinned tool versions) and runs with **zero external egress**: every judge / grader / embedding call is forced to a local Ollama model, so no payload or transcript ever leaves your machine. Off by default and RoE-gated, with live phase-by-phase progress, and findings surfaced in the Red Zone **AI Gauntlet Vulnerabilities** table and the pentest report. > **[Wiki: AI Gauntlet](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Gauntlet)** | **[Technical: AI_GAUNTLET_TECH_DOC.md](docs/readmes/AI_GAUNTLET_TECH_DOC.md)** ### GVM Vulnerability Scanner **GVM/OpenVAS** performs deep network-level vulnerability assessment with 170,000+ NVTs, probing services at the protocol layer for misconfigurations, outdated software, default credentials, and known CVEs. Complements Nuclei's web-layer findings. Seven pre-configured scan profiles from quick host discovery (~2 min) to exhaustive deep scanning (~8 hours). Findings are stored as Vulnerability nodes in Neo4j alongside the recon graph. > **[Wiki: GVM Vulnerability Scanning](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/GVM-Vulnerability-Scanning)** | **[Technical: README.GVM.md](docs/readmes/README.GVM.md)** ### AI Agent Orchestrator A **LangGraph-based autonomous agent** implementing the ReAct pattern. It progresses through three phases: **Informational** (intelligence gathering, graph queries, Shodan, Google dorking), **Exploitation** (Metasploit, Hydra credential testing, social engineering simulation), and **Post-Exploitation** (enumeration, lateral movement). The agent executes 14 security tools via MCP servers inside a Kali sandbox, supports parallel tool execution via **Wave Runner**, and provides real-time chat interaction with guidance, stop/resume, and approval workflows. **Deep Think** mode enables structured strategic analysis before acting. > **[Wiki: AI Agent Guide](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Agent-Guide)** | **[Technical: README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md](docs/readmes/README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md)** <img src="docs/assets/exploit.gif" alt="RedAmon Exploitation Demo" width="100%"/> #### Agent Tool Arsenal | Category | Tool | Description | Phases | MCP Server | |:-----:|-------|-------------|:------:|:----------:| | **Intelligence** | **query_graph** | Neo4j graph queries -- primary source of truth for recon data | All | -- | | | **web_search** | Internet search via Tavily for CVE details, exploit PoCs, advisories | All | -- | | | **cve_intel** | ProjectDiscovery `vulnx` -- structured CVE intelligence aggregating NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS + HackerOne + GitHub PoCs + Nuclei template availability. 69 lucene-filterable fields. Optional PDCP key (per-user, anonymous mode = 10 req/min) | All | network_recon :8000 | | | **tradecraft_lookup** | User-curated catalog of trusted security knowledge URLs (HackTricks, PayloadsAllTheThings, CVE PoC repos, vendor blogs) -- 6 auto-detected resource types, sitemap-driven section pick, sqlite+disk cache | Exploit, Post | -- | | | **shodan** | Shodan OSINT -- host details, reverse DNS, device search | Info, Exploit | -- | | | **google_dork** | Google dorking via SerpAPI -- exposed files, admin panels, directory listings | Info | -- | | **Recon & OSINT** | **execute_subfinder** | Passive subdomain enumeration via OSINT (CT logs, DNS datasets). No traffic to target | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_gau** | Passive URL discovery from Wayback Machine, Common Crawl, AlienVault OTX, URLScan. No traffic to target | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_amass** | OWASP Amass subdomain enumeration and network mapping (passive + active, ASN intel) | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | **Scanning** | **execute_naabu** | Fast port scanning and verification | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_nmap** | Deep service detection (-sV), OS fingerprint, NSE scripts | All | nmap :8004 | | | **execute_nuclei** | CVE verification and exploitation with 9,000+ templates + custom uploads | Info, Exploit | nuclei :8002 | | | **execute_httpx** | HTTP probing and fingerprinting -- status codes, titles, server headers, tech detection | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_wpscan** | WordPress vulnerability scanner -- detects vulnerable plugins, themes, users, misconfigurations | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | **Web & HTTP** | **execute_curl** | HTTP requests -- reachability, headers, status codes, banners | All | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_katana** | Web crawling and endpoint discovery with JS parsing and known-file enumeration | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_jsluice** | JavaScript static analysis for hidden API endpoints, URL paths, and secrets | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_arjun** | HTTP parameter discovery by brute-forcing ~25,000 common parameter names | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_ffuf** | Web fuzzing for hidden directories, files, virtual hosts, and parameters | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_playwright** | Headless Chromium browser automation -- JS-rendered content extraction and interactive scripting for SPAs, form testing, XSS verification | All | playwright :8005 | | **Exploitation** | **metasploit_console** | Persistent msfconsole -- exploit execution, session management, post-exploitation | Exploit, Post | metasploit :8003 | | | **msf_restart** | Full Metasploit reset -- kills all sessions, clears module state | Exploit, Post | metasploit :8003 | | | **execute_hydra** | THC Hydra brute force -- 50+ protocols (SSH, FTP, RDP, SMB, HTTP, MySQL, etc.) | Exploit, Post | network_recon :8000 | | **Code Execution** | **kali_shell** | Full Kali Linux shell -- nikto, whatweb, testssl, commix, sstimap, tplmap, ysoserial, phpggc, dnsrecon, dnsx, subzy, enum4linux-ng, netexec, kerbrute, bloodhound-python, bhgraph, certipy-ad, bloodyAD, jwt_tool, graphql-cop, graphqlmap, betterleaks, semgrep, hashcat, john, cewl, paramspider, Node.js + npm, Python libs (websockets, zeep, python3-saml, boto3, msal, azure-identity, google-auth, google-cloud-storage), pre-staged post-exploit toolkits at /opt/tools/{linux,windows}/ (linpeas, LinEnum, pspy64, deepce, winPEAS, PowerUp, PrivescCheck), and 70+ CLI tools | All | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_code** | Write and run code files (Python, bash, Ruby, Perl, C, C++) -- no shell escaping | Exploit, Post | network_recon :8000 | | **Supply Chain** | **execute_osv_scanner** | Offline OSV verdict -- is a package known-malicious (`MAL-`) or known-vulnerable (`CVE`/`GHSA`)? Passive, zero network (reads the local OSV DB). Accepts a purl, lockfile, or SBOM | All | network_recon :8000 | | | **execute_guarddog** | Behavioural malware analysis of one package (install hooks, obfuscation, exfil, typosquat). Downloads the tarball, so it dispatches to the hardened analyzer sandbox -- never unpacked inline | Info, Exploit | network_recon :8000 | | **Traffic (TrafficMind)** | **proxy_brain** | **DANGEROUS** -- web hacking in code: it writes Python against a pre-imported `redamon` SDK to work the captured HTTP corpus (`search` / `get` / `sitemap` / `params` / `grep` / `diff` / `to_curl` / `query` reads, `decode` / `jwt().forge()` crypto, `replay` / `batch(parallel)` / `fuzz` active sends, and `browser(id)` to drive a real Chromium for DOM-based XSS / SPA / post-JS bugs). Reads run in any phase; active sends and the browser are host-pinned to the origin, tenant-scoped by a signed tag, exploitation-gated, budgeted, and re-captured. The agent reads its own on-demand cookbook via `redamon.manual()`. Replaces the former ten `proxy_*` tools | All (send: Exploit, Post) | network_recon :8000 | | **Workspace FS** | **fs_read** | Read workspace file with line numbers, auto-detects binary, stores snapshot for `fs_diff vs_last_read` | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_read_many** | Batched read of multiple files, capped at `max_total_bytes` (default 200 KB) | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_stat** | Metadata only -- size, mtime, mode, type, optional SHA-256 | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_write** | Atomic create/overwrite/append, auto-creates parents | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_edit** | Exact-string replacement with uniqueness check, records undo entry | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_multi_edit** | Multiple ordered edits in one call, all-or-nothing transaction | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_undo_edit** | Roll back last `fs_edit` / `fs_multi_edit`, per-file undo stack capped at 20 | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_delete** | Delete file or directory (recursive flag required for dirs) | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_move** | Move or rename a path, auto-creates destination parents | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_copy** | Copy file or directory tree, permissions normalized so host user can edit | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_mkdir** | Create directory, idempotent | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_chmod** | Change permission bits (octal `0o755` or symbolic `+x`) | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_symlink_create** | Create symlink, refuses endpoints that would escape the workspace | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_grep** | Ripgrep over workspace with regex, 30s timeout, 1000-match cap, works on in-flight job logs | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_glob** | Glob pattern search sorted newest-first, capped 500 results | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_find** | Metadata search (name + mtime + size + type filters), 30s walk timeout, 5000-result ceiling | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_list** | Single-directory listing with type / size / mtime, capped 200 entries | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_tree** | Depth-limited ASCII tree, skips `.git`, `node_modules`, `__pycache__` | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_symbols** | Tree-sitter AST outline (function / class / method names + line ranges), 15 languages (py, js, ts, tsx, jsx, java, go, rs, rb, php, c, cpp, cs, kt, swift, scala) | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_symlink_read** | Resolve symlink to its raw target without following it | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_hash** | SHA-256 or MD5 hash of a file, streams in 64 KB chunks | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_diff** | Unified diff between two files, or between a file and its last `fs_read` snapshot (detects concurrent writes in fireteam) | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_extract** | Safe extraction of tar / zip / gz archives, rejects zip-slip and tar-slip paths | All | -- (in-process) | | | **fs_archive** | Bundle workspace paths into tar.gz or zip for one-click operator download | All | -- (in-process) | | **Background Jobs** | **job_spawn** | Detach tool call as asyncio background task, output tee'd to `jobs/<id>.log` in real-time, phase / RoE checks at spawn | All | -- (in-process) | | | **job_status** | Non-blocking status query -- current status, log size, last 40 lines of output, survives agent restart via `<id>.meta.json` | All | -- (in-process) | | | **job_wait** | Block up to N seconds for the job to finish, returns same shape as `job_status` | All | -- (in-process) | | | **job_cancel** | Cancel a running job, status flips to `cancelled`, no-op on terminal jobs | All | -- (in-process) | | | **job_list** | List background jobs for the project, filter by `active=true` / `false` / omit for all | All | -- (in-process) | All MCP tools run inside a Kali Linux sandbox container. **Workspace FS** and **Background Jobs** tools run **in-process inside the agent container** and operate exclusively on the per-project workspace at `/workspace/<projectId>/` -- path validation rejects every traversal trick (project-id injection, symlink escape, zip-slip, tar-slip). See **[Agent Workspace wiki page](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Agent-Workspace)** for the full reference. Tools marked as dangerous require manual confirmation before execution. Stealth mode restricts active tools to passive-only or single-target operations. **Note:** WPScan is licensed under the [WPScan Public Source License](https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/blob/master/LICENSE) (not MIT). Free for pentesting assessments and personal use; commercial use may require a separate license from [wpscan.com](https://wpscan.com). #### MCP Tool Plugins (extending the agent's tool arsenal) Beyond the 5 built-in MCP servers above, you can plug **any Model-Context-Protocol server** into the agent as a *tool plugin* (Shodan, GitHub, Censys, Hugging Face, mitmproxy, your own internal MCPs) without editing code, rebuilding containers, or running migrations. Open **Global Settings → MCP Tool Plugins**. Two paths: pick one of **39 prefilled Quick-Add presets** (OSINT, threat-intel, cloud, web-app scanners, reporting, reverse engineering; categories tagged on every card), or click **Add MCP** for a manual config. Three transports supported: `stdio`, `sse`, `streamable_http`. The orange **Discover and add new tools** button runs a live `list_tools()` against the draft, returns within 30 seconds, and auto-imports each discovered tool with its name, description, and a JSON-Schema-derived `args_format` (types, enums, defaults, min/max, per-property descriptions). Save → tools auto-appear in every project's Tool Matrix and in the agent's system prompt within ~1 second. No agent restart, no `prisma db push`. > **Full operator manual** (every form field, all 39 presets, the auth flow, the live discovery workflow, validation rules, troubleshooting, and the storage / security model): **[MCP Tool Plugins wiki page](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/MCP-Tool-Plugins)**. ### MCP Server: Your Own Agent Connecting *Into* RedAmon The mirror image of the plugins above. Instead of RedAmon's agent reaching *out* to tools, **your** agent connects *in* and drives RedAmon: your Claude Code session, an internal triage assistant, a nightly CI job, anything that speaks the Model Context Protocol. Mint an access token in **Global Settings → MCP Server** and it gets **48 tools** behind **17 permissions**: list projects, read scan status and settings, query the attack-surface graph in plain English or raw Cypher, read findings / suppressed findings / remediations, see why a finding ranks where it does and read its evidence, submit a quoted evidence review (RedAmon recomputes the score; the agent never sets one), record a triage verdict, start or stop a Priority Board run (spaced and capped per project), mute and unmute findings behind their own opt-in permission, run saved graph views, compare saved scan versions, get an attack-surface overview, exploit paths and blast radius, start / stop / queue a recon run, open an engagement, manage recon presets, and (off by default, behind three independent switches) run a command in the Kali sandbox. The token acts as **you**, inside **your own projects**. It is re-checked on every call, so a revoke takes effect on the agent's next call rather than its next reconnect; every graph read is rewritten to match only your tenant's nodes and runs in a read-only Neo4j session; and every write is a positive allowlist. Deliberately not exposed: the agent chat, deleting projects, your API keys, re-pointing a project's target, the engagement record, Mute Rules, setting a finding's score directly, changing a verdict a person made in the app, and any graph write beyond verdicts, reviews, triage runs and (opt-in) mutes. `MCP_SERVER_ENABLED` is off after a normal install and refused over plain HTTP on a server deploy, and `MCP_DISABLED_TOOLS` withdraws a single misbehaving tool without taking the whole surface down. #### Agent Onboarding (teaching *your* agent how to use RedAmon) Connecting an agent tells it *that* the tools exist. It does not tell it what RedAmon is, what the recon pipeline produces, or which of the 48 tools to reach for first. **Agent Onboarding writes those instructions for you.** Pick one of **14 Agent Profiles** (bug bounty, penetration testing, continuous attack-surface monitoring, vulnerability management, triage assistance, asset inventory / CMDB, compliance evidence, DevSecOps CI gating, reporting, M&A and third-party risk, threat-intel correlation, SOC enrichment, research and training, or custom) and RedAmon ticks the permissions that job needs and generates a pack tailored to it: a `SKILL.md` plus reference files covering the operating model, the graph's shape, the tool sequence for that job, the traps specific to it, and tool by tool exactly what *this* token can and cannot do. The tool facts are read from the server's own live tool list at export time, so a pack can never describe a tool differently from how the server serves it. Clients that never load a skill file (Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, Goose, Gemini CLI, Codex CLI) receive a shorter version of the same guidance inline the moment they connect. No profile ever ticks `kali:exec` or `recon:overwrite` for you, not even the ones that recommend them: a shell on a target-facing box and an irreversible graph wipe should never arrive as the side effect of choosing an item from a dropdown. > **Agent Skills teach RedAmon's agent. Agent Onboarding teaches yours.** > **[Wiki: MCP Server](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/MCP-Server)** | **[Wiki: MCP API Reference](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/MCP-API-Reference)** | **[Technical: README.MCP.SERVER.md](docs/readmes/README.MCP.SERVER.md)** ### Agent Workspace: Per-Project Filesystem, Background Jobs, Auto-Offload > **Watch the demo:** [RedAmon Agent Workspace: AI Runs 4 Parallel Pentests and Writes Its Own Report (YouTube)](https://youtu.be/dkgIk78T7Hw) Every project gets a persistent `/workspace/<projectId>/` directory that the agent, the kali-sandbox, and you (through the **FileSystem Drawer** in the Red Zone) all see at the same time. Four purpose-built folders are auto-created and protected from rename/delete: `notes/` for the agent's scratch work and draft reports, `tool-outputs/` for auto-offloaded huge outputs, `jobs/` for background-job logs, and `uploads/` for files you drop in for the agent to read. The agent is taught the layout on every think step via a `WORKSPACE_LAYOUT_BLOCK`, and when you drop files into `uploads/` the block surfaces them under a `CHECK THESE NOW` directive so the agent reads them before continuing whatever else it was doing. The agent gets **24 filesystem tools** (`fs_read`, `fs_write`, `fs_edit`, `fs_multi_edit`, `fs_undo_edit`, `fs_grep`, `fs_glob`, `fs_find`, `fs_diff`, `fs_symbols`, `fs_archive`, `fs_extract`, and more) plus **5 background-job tools** (`job_spawn`, `job_status`, `job_wait`, `job_cancel`, `job_list`). Long scans like `nuclei` or `hydra` detach as asyncio tasks and stream output to `jobs/<id>.log`, so the agent can `fs_grep` for hits mid-flight without blocking the next reasoning step. Outputs over 20 KB automatically offload to `tool-outputs/<utc-iso>-<tool>.txt` and the LLM receives a head/tail stub plus the file path, so a 5 MB Playwright DOM dump never derails the context window. The drawer surfaces all of this with breadcrumb navigation, drag-and-drop upload, inline preview, SHA-256 properties, per-folder tar.gz download, and a Jobs tab with live status badges and cancel. Path validation rejects every traversal trick (project-id injection, symlink escape, zip-slip, tar-slip, protected-folder bypass via normalization) and is server-enforced. Jobs survive agent restart via on-disk metadata: orphan running jobs flip to `interrupted` on boot so the UI never shows a forever-spinning row. > **Full operator manual** (every drawer feature, all 29 workspace tools, the auto-offload policy map, the four protected folders, fireteam coordination patterns via `fs_diff vs_last_read`, and the path-validation safety model): **[Agent Workspace wiki page](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Agent-Workspace)**. ### Fireteam: Parallel Specialist Sub-Agents The agent's most powerful execution mode. When an objective decomposes into **independent investigation angles** (auth surface, route map, header policy; or 5 candidate CVEs to triage in parallel), the root agent fans out into N **specialist sub-agents** that work concurrently inside the same backend, each running its own multi-step ReAct loop with a focused mission. This is RedAmon's implementation of the **Scatter-Gather ReAct (SG-ReAct)** architectural pattern: a root agent that decides when to fan out, a bounded fireteam of specialists that work in parallel, and a fan-in step that merges their findings back into a single consolidated worldview. Every safety guarantee that applies to the root agent also applies to every member: hard guardrails, soft guardrails, phase gating, Rules of Engagement, and dangerous-tool confirmations (handled **per-member, in parallel**; N members can each be awaiting your approval on their own panel simultaneously without serializing). Recursion is forbidden (a member cannot itself deploy a fireteam) and every wave has a hard cap on members, an iteration budget per member, and a wall-clock timeout. The result is wall-clock parallelism without coordination chaos, predictable termination, and an audit trail where every action is attributable to the specialist that produced it. > **[Wiki: Fireteam (Parallel Specialists)](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Fireteam-Parallel-Specialists)** | **[Technical: README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md](docs/readmes/README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md#fireteam--parallel-specialist-sub-agents)** ### AI Model Providers Supports **5 providers** and **400+ models**: OpenAI (GPT-5.2, GPT-5, GPT-4.1), Anthropic (Claude Opus 4.6, Sonnet 4.5), OpenRouter (300+ models), AWS Bedrock, and any **OpenAI-compatible endpoint** (Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio, Groq, etc.). Models are dynamically fetched, no hardcoded lists. OpenAI-compatible provider settings include a **reasoning effort** control. Enable it to send `reasoning_effort` with `low`, `medium`, `high`, or `max`; leave it disabled to send nothing and use the model's default. Enable it only for thinking-capable models: a model without the thinking capability rejects a level, and the agent transparently retries without it. The available effort levels are model-dependent. Canonical OpenAI providers and unrelated OpenAI-compatible endpoints keep their existing behavior. > **[Wiki: AI Model Providers](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Model-Providers)** ### Attack Surface Graph A **Neo4j knowledge graph** with 19 node types and 20+ relationship types, the single source of truth for the target's attack surface. The agent queries it before every decision via natural language → Cypher translation. > **[Wiki: Attack Surface Graph](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Attack-Surface-Graph)** | **[Technical: GRAPH.SCHEMA.md](docs/readmes/GRAPH.SCHEMA.md)** ### EvoGraph: Attack Chain Evolution A persistent, evolutionary graph tracking everything the AI agent does: tool executions, discoveries, failures, and strategic decisions. Structured chain context replaces flat execution traces, improving agent efficiency by 25%+. Cross-session memory means the agent never starts from zero. > **[Wiki: EvoGraph](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/EvoGraph-Attack-Chain-Evolution)** | **[Technical: README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md](docs/readmes/README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md#evograph--evolutive-attack-chain-graph)** ### Multi-Session Parallel Attack Chains Launch **multiple concurrent agent sessions** against the same project. Each session creates its own AttackChain in EvoGraph. New sessions automatically load findings and failure lessons from all prior sessions, avoiding redundant work. > **[Wiki: AI Agent Guide](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Agent-Guide)** ### TrafficMind: HTTP Traffic Capture RedAmon's built-in, engagement-scoped **proxy history**: a credential-free man-in-the-middle proxy (powered by **mitmproxy**) sits between every offensive tool and its target, records the full request/response of each HTTP transaction, tags it with *who* produced it (project / user / run / tool via a signed HMAC context tag), and stores it in Postgres through a trusted, INSERT-only ingest worker. Think of an always-on HTTP history, except it turns on with a toggle, attributes every request to its source, and is queryable by the operator **and** the AI agent. Capture is **off by default** and gated at two levels (a global master switch that runs the proxy, plus a per-project routing toggle). Eight recon tools and eight agent HTTP tools (`execute_curl`, `execute_httpx`, `execute_playwright`, `execute_nuclei`, `execute_katana`, `execute_ffuf`, `execute_arjun`, `execute_wpscan`) are routed, so both the pipeline's and the agent's own crawl/fuzz/scan traffic is captured, searchable, and replayable. The proxy holds no secrets, an SSRF egress guard with a DNS-rebinding IP pin keeps it from pivoting into internal infrastructure, sensitive headers are redacted, and passive signals (reflected params, missing security headers, cookie-flag issues) are computed for free on every response. A **TrafficMind** view in the top navigation exposes the corpus as a paginated, filterable, proxy-style table with a request/response detail drawer, CSV/JSON export, and reference-counted body cleanup. The agent works the corpus through a single code-native tool, **`proxy_brain`**: it writes Python against a pre-imported `redamon` SDK and composes the attack itself (loops, conditionals, crypto, oracles) rather than picking from a fixed menu. The SDK's read calls (`search`, `get`, `sitemap`, `params`, `grep`, `diff`, `to_curl`, `query`) run in any phase; its active calls (`replay`, `batch`, `fuzz`) send live traffic and are gated to the exploitation phases, as is `browser(id)`, which drives a real Chromium to confirm bugs that only surface after JavaScript runs (DOM-based XSS, SPA-only routes, JS-minted CSRF). `proxy_brain` runs in the Kali sandbox but holds no database credential: it reaches the corpus only through the agent's `/traffic/exec` (read), `/traffic/replay` (active) and `/traffic/browser` (browser) endpoints, tenant-scoped by a signed tag the sandbox cannot forge, host-pinned to the origin on every send, budget-capped, stealth-restricted, and re-captured. The agent reads its own on-demand cookbook with `redamon.manual()`. See [`docs/readmes/README.TRAFFIC.md`](docs/readmes/README.TRAFFIC.md) for the architecture. > **[Wiki: TrafficMind](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/TrafficMind)** | **[Technical: README.TRAFFIC.md](docs/readmes/README.TRAFFIC.md)** ### Reverse Shells Unified view of active sessions: meterpreter, reverse/bind shells, and listeners. Built-in terminal with a **Command Whisperer** that translates plain English into shell commands. > **[Wiki: Reverse Shells](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Reverse-Shells)** ### RedAmon Terminal Full interactive **PTY shell access** to the Kali sandbox container directly from the graph page via **xterm.js**. Access all pre-installed pentesting tools (Metasploit, Nmap, Nuclei, Hydra, sqlmap) without leaving the browser. Features dark terminal theme, connection status indicator, auto-reconnect with exponential backoff, fullscreen mode, and browser-side keepalive. > **[Wiki: The Graph Dashboard](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/The-Graph-Dashboard#redamon-terminal)** ### CypherFix: Automated Vulnerability Remediation Two-agent pipeline. A **Triage Agent** scores every finding in the graph with a fixed risk model (how likely it is to be real, times how likely it is to be exploited, times how bad that would be, times how reachable it is), groups the findings that share a fix, and has an LLM check the evidence behind each one it can judge. The model corrects the factors and never produces a score, every quote it gives is verified against the evidence it was sent, and it binds no tools. The ranking is complete and correct with no model configured at all. A **CodeFix Agent** clones the target repo, explores the codebase with 11 tools, implements fixes, and opens a GitHub PR, replicating Claude Code's agentic design. Because the cloned repo is untrusted, its **build/test commands run in an isolated, secret-free sandbox container** (not in the agent), and the GitHub token never enters it. > **[Wiki: CypherFix](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/CypherFix-Automated-Remediation)** | **[Technical: README.CYPHERFIX_AGENTS.md](docs/readmes/README.CYPHERFIX_AGENTS.md)** ### Agent Skills An **LLM-powered Intent Router** classifies user requests into agent skills: CVE (MSF), SQL Injection, XSS, SSRF, RCE, Path Traversal / LFI / RFI, Credential Testing, Social Engineering, Availability Testing, or custom user-defined skills uploaded as Markdown files. Ready-to-use **[community skills](agentic/community-skills/)** ship for API testing, XSS, SQLi, XXE, BFLA, SSTI, IDOR / BOLA, insecure deserialization, mass assignment, subdomain takeover, and insecure file uploads -- download the `.md` file and upload it via **Global Settings > Agent Skills** to activate it for your user. You can also [contribute your own](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Agent-Skills#share-your-skills-with-the-community) by opening a PR. > **[Wiki: Agent Skills](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Agent-Skills)** | **[Community Skills](agentic/community-skills/)** ### Chat Skills **On-demand reference injection** via `/skill` command in the agent chat. Chat Skills are tactical reference docs -- tool playbooks, vulnerability guides, framework-specific notes -- that you inject into the agent's context exactly when you need them. Type `/skill ssrf` to load SSRF expertise, or click the skill picker button for a browsable list. **46 reference skills** ship with RedAmon covering vulnerabilities (JWT, OAuth/OIDC, CSRF, race conditions, business logic, prototype pollution, ReDoS, 2FA bypass, LDAP/XPath injection, web cache poisoning, CORS, host header injection, clickjacking, CRLF, and more), tooling (sqlmap, nuclei, ffuf, nmap, httpx, naabu, katana, subfinder, semgrep), protocols (GraphQL, WebSocket, SOAP/WS-Security, SAML), technologies (Firebase, Supabase), frameworks (Next.js, FastAPI, NestJS), Active Directory (kill chain, Kerberoasting/ASREPRoast, AD-CS ESC1-15, BloodHound path-to-DA), cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP), and post-exploitation (Docker escape, Linux / Windows privesc). Unlike Agent Skills (which drive classification and phase-aware workflows), Chat Skills are supplementary context that persists until you change or remove them. > **[Wiki: Chat Skills](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Chat-Skills)** | **[Community Chat Skills](agentic/skills/)** ### GitHub Secret Hunter Scans GitHub repositories, gists, and commit history for exposed secrets using **40+ regex patterns** and Shannon entropy analysis. > **[Wiki: GitHub Secret Hunting](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/GitHub-Secret-Hunting)** ### Secret Multiscanner Hunts live credentials across **14 kinds of target** with **1060 detectors**: git repositories, GitHub (including deleted commits), GitLab, Docker registries, Hugging Face, S3, GCS, a local filesystem, Jenkins, Elasticsearch, Postman, CircleCI and Travis CI. It goes one step past a regex scanner by calling the owning service's API with the credential it found, so a finding says whether the secret is **actually still live**, dead, or never checked. Each source is configured once per project and runs in **its own hardened container** (isolated network, read-only root, non-root, exactly one credential and no graph access), so different sources scan **in parallel**. Results are stored as `MultiscannerScan → MultiscannerRepository / Image / Model / Bucket / Endpoint → MultiscannerFinding` nodes and surface in the Red Zone secrets table, live findings first. Configure it in **project settings**, start it per source from the **"Other Scans" modal**. > **[Wiki: Secret Multiscanner](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Secret-Multiscanner)** ### Supply Chain / Malicious Package Detection Detects known-malicious (`MAL-`) and known-vulnerable (`CVE`/`GHSA`) packages **fully offline** against a local OSV database, across three layers that share one engine and one graph model. **L1** audits an uploaded SBOM / lockfile from the **"Other Scans" modal**; **L2 (Supply-Chain Recon)** harvests the npm package set a live target actually serves during recon (source maps, imports, technologies) with zero manifest; **L3** gives the AI agent on-demand `execute_osv_scanner` / `execute_guarddog` tools. Untrusted bytes (tarballs, target JS) are processed in a hardened, secret-free, network-isolated **DIRTY** sandbox (`cap_drop=ALL`, read-only, no-install); only a schema-validated JSON artifact crosses into the creds-holding writer. Results are stored as `Package` / `MalPackageFinding` nodes (`MAL-` = malicious, `CVE`/`GHSA` = vulnerable, GuardDog = suspicious). Populate the offline DB once with `./redamon.sh supply-chain-sync npm`. > **[Technical: README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md](docs/readmes/README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md)** ### Project Settings **500+ configurable parameters** across 16 tabs controlling every tool's behavior, from scan modules to agent approval gates. Managed through the webapp UI. > **[Wiki: Project Settings Reference](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Project-Settings-Reference)** <img src="docs/assets/settings.gif" alt="RedAmon Project Settings" width="100%"/> ### Rules of Engagement (RoE) Upload a RoE document (PDF, TXT, MD, DOCX) to auto-configure project settings and enforce engagement constraints. Enforcement at both the recon pipeline (excluded hosts, rate limits, time windows) and AI agent (prompt injection, severity phase cap, tool restrictions) layers. > **[Wiki: Rules of Engagement](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Rules-of-Engagement)** ### Insights Dashboard 30+ interactive charts across 4 sections: attack chains & exploits, attack surface, vulnerabilities & CVE intelligence, and graph overview. All data pulled live from Neo4j and PostgreSQL. > **[Wiki: Insights Dashboard](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Insights-Dashboard)** <img src="docs/assets/insights.gif" alt="RedAmon Insights Dashboard" width="100%"/> ### Target Guardrail LLM-based guardrail preventing targeting of unauthorized domains: blocks government sites, major tech companies, financial institutions, and social media platforms. Operates at both project creation and agent initialization. Government, military, educational, and international organization domains (`.gov`, `.mil`, `.edu`, `.int`) are permanently blocked by a deterministic hard guardrail that cannot be disabled. > **[Wiki: Creating a Project](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Creating-a-Project)** ### Tool Confirmation Per-tool human-in-the-loop gate for dangerous operations. When enabled, the agent pauses before executing high-impact tools (Nmap, Nuclei, Metasploit, Hydra, Kali shell, code execution) and presents an inline **Allow / Deny** prompt in the chat timeline. Supports both single-tool and parallel-wave (plan) confirmation modes. Users can approve, reject, or modify tool arguments before execution proceeds. Disabled via the `Require Tool Confirmation` toggle in Project Settings. > **[Wiki: Pentest Agent (Tool Confirmation)](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Pentest-Agent#tool-confirmation-gate)** ### Pentest Reports Professional, client-ready HTML reports with 11 sections. When an AI model is configured, 6 sections receive **LLM-generated narratives** including executive summary, risk analysis, and prioritized remediation triage. **[View example report](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wiki/samugit83/redamon/docs/Pentest%20Report%20%E2%80%94%20devergolabs.com.html)**. > **[Wiki: Pentest Reports](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Pentest-Reports)** ### Data Export & Import Full project backup and restore through the web interface: settings, conversations, graph data, recon/GVM/GitHub hunt results as a portable ZIP archive. > **[Wiki: Data Export & Import](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Data-Export-and-Import)** --- ## System Architecture ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph User["👤 User Layer"] Browser[Web Browser] CLI[Terminal/CLI] end subgraph Frontend["🖥️ Frontend Layer"] Webapp[Next.js Webapp :3000] end subgraph Backend["⚙️ Backend Layer"] Agent[AI Agent Orchestrator FastAPI + LangGraph :8090] ReconOrch[Recon Orchestrator FastAPI + Docker SDK :8010] end subgraph Tools["🔧 MCP Tools Layer"] NetworkRecon[Network Recon Server Curl + Naabu :8000] Nuclei[Nuclei Server :8002] Metasploit[Metasploit Server :8003] Nmap[Nmap Server :8004] end subgraph Scanning["🔍 Scanning Layer"] Recon[Recon Pipeline Docker Container] GVM[GVM/OpenVAS Scanner Network Vuln Assessment] GHHunt[GitHub Secret Hunter Credential Scanning] Multiscanner[Secret Multiscanner 14 Sources · 1060 Detectors] end subgraph Data["💾 Data Layer"] Neo4j[(Neo4j Graph DB :7474/:7687)] Postgres[(PostgreSQL Project Settings :5432)] end subgraph LLMProviders["🧠 LLM Providers"] OpenAI[OpenAI] Anthropic[Anthropic] LocalLLM[Local Models Ollama · vLLM · LM Studio] OpenRouter[OpenRouter 300+ Models] Bedrock[AWS Bedrock] end subgraph External["🌐 External APIs"] GitHubAPI[GitHub API Repos & Code Search] SourceAPIs[Secret Sources GitLab · Docker · S3 · GCS Hugging Face · CI · ...] end subgraph Targets["🎯 Target Layer"] Target[Target Systems] GuineaPigs[Guinea Pigs Test VMs] end Browser --> Webapp CLI --> Recon Webapp <-->|WebSocket| Agent Webapp -->|REST + SSE| ReconOrch Webapp --> Neo4j Webapp --> Postgres ReconOrch -->|Docker SDK| Recon ReconOrch -->|Docker SDK| GVM ReconOrch -->|Docker SDK| GHHunt ReconOrch -->|Docker SDK, one per source| Multiscanner ReconOrch -->|Multiscanner ingest| Neo4j Recon -->|Fetch Settings| Webapp GHHunt -->|GitHub API| GitHubAPI Multiscanner -->|GitHub API| GitHubAPI Multiscanner --> SourceAPIs Agent -->|API| OpenAI Agent -->|API| Anthropic Agent -->|API| LocalLLM Agent -->|API| OpenRouter Agent -->|API| Bedrock Agent --> Neo4j Agent -->|MCP Protocol| NetworkRecon Agent -->|MCP Protocol| Nuclei Agent -->|MCP Protocol| Metasploit Agent -->|MCP Protocol| Nmap Recon --> Neo4j GVM -->|Reads Recon Output| Recon GVM --> Neo4j GVM --> Target GVM --> GuineaPigs NetworkRecon --> Target Nuclei --> Target Metasploit --> Target Nmap --> Target NetworkRecon --> GuineaPigs Nuclei --> GuineaPigs Metasploit --> GuineaPigs Nmap --> GuineaPigs ``` > **Full architecture diagrams** (data flow, Docker containers, recon pipeline, agent workflow, MCP integration): **[ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/readmes/ARCHITECTURE.md)** > > **Technology stack** (70+ technologies across frontend, backend, AI, databases, security tools): **[TECH_STACK.md](docs/readmes/TECH_STACK.md)** --- ## Components | Component | Description | Documentation | |-----------|-------------|---------------| | **Reconnaissance Pipeline** | Parallelized fan-out/fan-in OSINT and vulnerability scanning pipeline | [README.RECON.md](docs/readmes/README.RECON.md) | | **Recon Orchestrator** | Container lifecycle management via Docker SDK | [README.RECON_ORCHESTRATOR.md](docs/readmes/README.RECON_ORCHESTRATOR.md) | | **Docker Socket Broker** | Filtering reverse-proxy for the Docker socket: spawned scan containers reach the daemon through it, so they can only create the known tool images (allowlisted, no host mounts / privileged / arbitrary images) | n/a | | **Graph Database** | Neo4j attack surface mapping with multi-tenant support | [README.GRAPH_DB.md](docs/readmes/README.GRAPH_DB.md) · [GRAPH.SCHEMA.md](docs/readmes/GRAPH.SCHEMA.md) | | **MCP Tool Servers** | Security tools via Model Context Protocol (Kali sandbox) | [README.MCP.md](docs/readmes/README.MCP.md) | | **AI Agent Orchestrator** | LangGraph-based autonomous agent with ReAct pattern | [README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md](docs/readmes/README.AGENTIC_SYSTEM.md) | | **CypherFix Agents** | Automated triage + code fix + GitHub PR | [README.CYPHERFIX_AGENTS.md](docs/readmes/README.CYPHERFIX_AGENTS.md) | | **Web Application** | Next.js dashboard for visualization and AI interaction | [README.WEBAPP.md](docs/readmes/README.WEBAPP.md) | | **GVM Scanner** | Greenbone/OpenVAS network vulnerability scanner (170K+ NVTs) | [README.GVM.md](docs/readmes/README.GVM.md) | | **Secret Multiscanner** | Deep secret scanning across 14 source kinds (git, GitHub, GitLab, Docker, Hugging Face, S3, GCS, filesystem, Jenkins, Elasticsearch, Postman, CI) with 1060 detectors, live-credential verification, and one hardened container per source running in parallel | [Wiki: Secret Multiscanner](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Secret-Multiscanner) | | **Supply-Chain Scanner** | Offline malicious/vulnerable package detection (OSV-Scanner + GuardDog + retire.js) with a hardened DIRTY/CLEAN split; 3 layers (agent tools, standalone SBOM scan, live-target recon) | [README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md](docs/readmes/README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md) | | **PostgreSQL Database** | Project settings, user accounts, configuration data | [README.POSTGRES.md](docs/readmes/README.POSTGRES.md) | | **Settings Registry** | The one description of every recon parameter: its unit, bounds, engagement cap, stealth profile and who may write it. Every derived list the pipeline used to keep aligned by hand is a query over it | [README.SETTINGS_REGISTRY.md](docs/readmes/README.SETTINGS_REGISTRY.md) · [Wiki: Project Settings Registry](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Project-Settings-Registry) | | **Test Environments** | Intentionally vulnerable Docker containers for safe testing | [README.GPIGS.md](docs/readmes/README.GPIGS.md) | --- ## Documentation | Resource | Link | |----------|------| | **Full Wiki** (user guide) | **[github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki)** | | **Bug Bounty Coverage Audit** (397 classes, PDF) | **[Wiki: The Full Taxonomy Audit](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wiki/samugit83/redamon/docs/RedAmon_Bug_Bounty_Coverage.pdf)** | | Server Deployment (single-host) | **[Wiki: Deploying to a Server](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Deploying-to-a-Server)** · [tooling/deploy/single-host/README.md](tooling/deploy/single-host/README.md) | | **Security Posture** (defense-in-depth catalog) | **[docs/readmes/README.SECURITY_POSTURE.md](docs/readmes/README.SECURITY_POSTURE.md)** | | Supply-Chain / Malicious-Package Detection | [docs/readmes/README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md](docs/readmes/README.SUPPLY_CHAIN.md) | | Threat Model (STRIDE) | [docs/readmes/README.TM.SYSTEM_OVERVIEW.md](docs/readmes/README.TM.SYSTEM_OVERVIEW.md) | | Security Policy | [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | | AI-Assisted Development | **[Wiki: Ship Perfect PRs with AI](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/AI-Assisted-Development)** | | Developer Guide | [docs/readmes/README.DEV.md](docs/readmes/README.DEV.md) | | Architecture Diagrams | [docs/readmes/ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/readmes/ARCHITECTURE.md) | | Technology Stack | [docs/readmes/TECH_STACK.md](docs/readmes/TECH_STACK.md) | | Troubleshooting | [docs/readmes/TROUBLESHOOTING.md](docs/readmes/TROUBLESHOOTING.md) | | Changelog | [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) | | Full Disclaimer | [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md) | | Third-Party Licenses | [THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md](THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md) | | License | [LICENSE](LICENSE) | --- ## Troubleshooting RedAmon is fully Dockerized and runs on any OS with Docker Compose v2+. For OS-specific fixes (Linux, Windows, macOS), see **[Troubleshooting Guide](docs/readmes/TROUBLESHOOTING.md)** or the **[Wiki](https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/Troubleshooting)**. --- ## RedAmon HackLab <table> <tr> <td width="280" align="center"> <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/RedAmon-HackLab"> <img src="docs/assets/hacklab.png" alt="RedAmon HackLab" width="260"/> </a> </td> <td> <h3>Want to see RedAmon think like a real pentester?</h3> Explore real-time live attack sessions -- every step, every pivot, every exploit -- across 15 vulnerability categories on a live target. Full session logs, decoded walkthroughs, and video recordings showing the agent autonomously compromising a multi-service server from scratch. <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/RedAmon-HackLab">Explore the HackLab →</a>   |   <a href="https://github.com/samugit83/redamon/wiki/RedAmon-HackLab#community-sessions">Submit your own session →</a> Got an amazing agent session on your own target? Share it with the community -- session log + YouTube video. </td> </tr> </table> --- ## Community Showcase Videos, writeups, and real-world experiences from security professionals using RedAmon in the field. Want to be featured? See the [Content Creator](CONTRIBUTING.md#content-creator) track in CONTRIBUTING.md. ### Videos | Title | Link | |-------|------| | RedAmon v2.2.0, Social Engineering Test: Payload Delivery to Shell Access | [Watch](https://youtu.be/kVjV9K_eks4) | | AI Agent CVE Validation: Beyond Standard Tooling | [Watch](https://youtu.be/rypmP1SJon8) | | RedAmon 2.0, From 0 to 1000 GitHub Stars in 10 Days: Multi-Agent Parallel Attacks | [Watch](https://youtu.be/afViJUit0xE) | | Build an Autonomous AI Red Team Agent from Scratch: LangGraph + Metasploit + Neo4j Full Tutorial | [Watch](https://youtu.be/mO5CCkYlY94) | ### Real-World Case Studies | Who | What | Link | |-----|------|------| | Nipun Dinudaya | Deployed RedAmon on a company website, identified a critical SQL injection vulnerability that could have caused significant data exposure | [Read on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nipun-dinudaya-6159b32bb_redamon-cybersecurity-penetrationtesting-ugcPost-7431233870253166592-aLvb) | | Venkata Bhargav CH S | Used RedAmon during an internship at Ascent e-Digit Solutions: hands-on reconnaissance, DNS analysis, and attack surface mapping | [Read on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/venkata-bhargav-cybersecurity_cybersecurity-ethicalhacking-redteam-share-7434940660803182592-e9En) | ### Community Guides | Who | What | Link | |-----|------|------| | MrGood | Mastering Redamon: A Comprehensive Guide to Installation on Kali Linux, addressing Kali-specific Docker challenges and security posture | [Read on Medium](https://cyberaccoon.medium.com/mastering-redamon-a-comprehensive-guide-to-installation-on-kali-linux-ea544e6f5b9f) | | Bogdan Caraman | How to Install RedAmon on Debian 13 (Trixie) with OpenRouter, step-by-step guide with Docker setup, static IP, and systemd automation | [Read on Blog](https://blog.bogdancaraman.com/install-redamon-debian-13-openrouter/) | --- ## Contributing Contributions are welcome! Please read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for guidelines on how to get started, code style conventions, and the pull request process. --- ## Maintainers **Samuele Giampieri**: creator, maintainer & AI platform architect · [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/samuele-giampieri-b1b67597/) · [GitHub](https://github.com/samugit83) · [Devergo Labs](https://www.devergolabs.com/) **Ritesh Gohil**: maintainer & lead security researcher · [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/riteshgohil25/) · [GitHub](https://github.com/L4stPL4Y3R) --- ## Contact For questions, feedback, or collaboration inquiries: **samuele@redamon.org** **Sponsorship:** RedAmon is free and MIT licensed, and stays that way. If you would like to sponsor the project, write to the same address. Sponsorship helps cover development and testing costs. --- ## Legal > **Local by default; server deployment has a supported hardened path.** Out of the box RedAmon is meant to run on a **local machine** and does not include internet-facing security controls on its own. To run it on a public, internet-reachable server, use the **hardened single-host deploy** in [`tooling/deploy/single-host/`](tooling/deploy/single-host/), which puts the whole stack behind nginx + TLS, a host firewall, SSH hardening, and a single public HTTPS origin, with every internal service bound to loopback. Running the **raw** stack (without that deploy) on a public IP would expose unauthenticated internal services, so anything outside a trusted local network without the hardened deploy is entirely at your own risk. This project is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE). RedAmon integrates several third-party tools under their own licenses (MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD, GPL-2.0/3.0, AGPL-3.0, LGPL, and the WPScan Public Source License). Source code for all AGPL-licensed components is available at their upstream repositories. The full inventory and license obligations are documented in [THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md](THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md). > **Commercial use note**: The Kali sandbox image bundles **WPScan**, which is governed by the WPScan Public Source License. WPScan restricts commercial use (SaaS, paid product offerings, value-added services) without a separate license from the WPScan team. Pentesting engagements and personal use are permitted. If you intend to use RedAmon in a commercial product or service, review [THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md](THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.md) before distribution. See [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md) for full terms of use, acceptable use policy, and legal compliance requirements. --- Use responsibly. Test ethically. Defend better.

redamon

Content

Connection Info

You Might Also Like

redamon

Scan with WeChat to Share

Authentication Required

Content

Connection Info

You Might Also Like